Section 139 presumption in cheque cases survives unless the accused shows a practical probability against legally enforceable liability.

In a Section 138 prosecution, the Section 139 presumption operates once the factual foundation is established, and the accused need only show a practical probability against liability on the balance of probabilities. The Court noted that rebuttal may be drawn from defence evidence, admissions, inconsistencies in the complainant's case, cross-examination, and surrounding circumstances. On the facts, the admitted signature, cheque possession, absence of reply to notice, and inconsistent defence versions meant the presumption was not rebutted, so conviction was sustained. However, considering the nature of the offence, delay, and compensatory sentencing, the punishment was reduced and compensation directed instead of a harsher custodial sentence.

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Issues: (i) whether, in a prosecution under Sections 138 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the accused had rebutted the statutory presumption that the cheque was issued for discharge of a legally enforceable debt or liability; (ii) whether the sentence required interference and reduction.

Issue (i): Whether, in a prosecution under Sections 138 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the accused had rebutted the statutory presumption that the cheque was issued for discharge of a legally enforceable debt or liability.

Analysis: The presumption under Section 139 is a presumption of law and arises once the factual foundation for drawing it is established. The accused is not required to disprove the prosecution case in its entirety, but must prove the contrary to the standard of a prudent person on a balance of practical probabilities. The accused may rely not only on defence evidence but also on admissions, improbabilities in the complainant's case, cross-examination, and surrounding circumstances. Here, the cheque was proved to be in the complainant's possession, the signature was admitted, no reply was sent to the statutory notice, and the defence versions were inconsistent and unsupported by credible material. The circumstances projected by the accused did not make the non-existence of liability reasonably probable.

Conclusion: The statutory presumption was not rebutted and the conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was upheld.

Issue (ii): Whether the sentence required interference and reduction.

Analysis: While sustaining the conviction, the Court considered the nature of the offence, the long pendency, and the need to compensate the complainant adequately rather than impose a deterrent substantive sentence of imprisonment. Leniency in sentencing was found justified, subject to compensation being paid to the victim.

Conclusion: The sentence was modified and reduced, with compensation directed in place of the earlier punitive sentence.

Final Conclusion: The revision petition succeeded only to the extent of sentence modification, while the finding of guilt and conviction were maintained.

Ratio Decidendi: In a prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the accused rebuts the Section 139 presumption only by proving a practical probability against issuance of the cheque for a legally enforceable liability, and such rebuttal may be built from the complainant's materials, cross-examination, and surrounding circumstances without proving innocence beyond reasonable doubt.

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