Court-fee deficiency in appeals: Section 149 gives discretionary relief, but no automatic right to time for short payment.

Memoranda of appeal filed in the High Court are outside Section 6(2) of the Court-fees Act, which was construed as confined to courts governed by Section 6(1). Section 149 of the Civil Procedure Code may operate alongside Section 4 of the Court-fees Act to allow time for making good a deficient court fee, but only as a judicial discretion and not as an automatic entitlement. Poverty or inability to pay the full fee is not, by itself, enough; relief depends on bona fide circumstances and special facts showing the deficiency was beyond the litigant's control.

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Issues: (i) Whether Section 6(2) of the Court-fees Act applies to memoranda of appeal presented in the High Court. (ii) Whether Section 149 of the Civil Procedure Code can be read with Section 4 of the Court-fees Act so as to permit time to be granted for making good deficiency in court-fee on an insufficiently stamped memorandum of appeal filed in the High Court. (iii) Whether poverty or inability to pay the full court-fee at the time of filing an appeal is, by itself, a sufficient ground for extension of time under Section 149 of the Civil Procedure Code.

Issue (i): Whether Section 6(2) of the Court-fees Act applies to memoranda of appeal presented in the High Court.

Analysis: Section 6(1) was treated as the charging provision for courts other than those mentioned in Sections 3 and 4. The language of Section 6(2), especially the words "notwithstanding the provisions of Sub-section (1)", was construed as referring only to the courts governed by Section 6(1). The structure of the Act, including Sections 5, 6A and 6B, also showed that Section 6(2) was not designed for High Courts. The conclusion was reinforced by the inconsistency that would otherwise arise with the special procedure prescribed for High Courts under Section 5.

Conclusion: Section 6(2) does not apply to memoranda of appeal presented in the High Court.

Issue (ii): Whether Section 149 of the Civil Procedure Code can be read with Section 4 of the Court-fees Act so as to permit time to be granted for making good deficiency in court-fee on an insufficiently stamped memorandum of appeal filed in the High Court.

Analysis: The two enactments were treated as dealing with cognate procedural matters and therefore as parts of one scheme. Section 149 was read as qualifying the operation of Section 4 so that an insufficiently stamped document may be tentatively received while the Court considers whether time should be granted. The discretion under Section 149 was held to be judicial, not arbitrary, and could not be converted into a matter of course. A wrong practice could not override the statute, and the Court rejected the contention that an insufficiently stamped memorandum must invariably be accepted for rectification in the High Court.

Conclusion: Section 149 does not override Section 4 so as to create an absolute right to time; the matter remains within judicial discretion.

Issue (iii): Whether poverty or inability to pay the full court-fee at the time of filing an appeal is, by itself, a sufficient ground for extension of time under Section 149 of the Civil Procedure Code.

Analysis: The Court held that no hard and fast rule could be laid down. Mere inability to raise funds was not enough by itself. The circumstances had to be examined case by case, and the discretion would ordinarily be exercised where the deficiency arose from bona fide mistake or circumstances beyond control. Poverty or inability could justify relief only where special circumstances showed bona fides, such as substantial payment having already been made or a genuine inability caused by factors beyond the litigant's control.

Conclusion: Poverty or inability to pay full court-fee is a sufficient ground only in special circumstances and not otherwise.

Final Conclusion: The reference was answered against the appellant on the first two questions, while the third question was treated as not arising on any supposed uniform practice. The Court upheld a discretionary and fact-sensitive approach to deficient court-fee in appeals.

Ratio Decidendi: Section 149 of the Civil Procedure Code operates as a discretionary procedural safeguard alongside the Court-fees Act, but it does not confer an automatic right to cure deficient court-fee; relief depends on judicial assessment of bona fides and special circumstances.

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