Presumption of legitimacy bars routine DNA testing of a child born in marriage absent pleaded non-access and strong prima facie proof.

A minor child born during a valid marriage is protected by the conclusive presumption of legitimacy under Section 112 of the Evidence Act, and DNA testing cannot be ordered as a routine or exploratory measure to prove adultery. Such testing is permissible only in exceptional cases where non-access is pleaded and supported by strong prima facie material, and where compelling necessity leaves no other way to resolve the dispute. Refusal by the mother to subject the child to DNA testing cannot, by itself, justify an adverse inference of adultery under Section 114(h), because that provision cannot override Section 112. The spouse must prove adultery by independent admissible evidence.

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Issues: (i) Whether a DNA test of a minor child born during the subsistence of a valid marriage could be directed in the absence of a pleaded case of non-access so as to displace the conclusive presumption under Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. (ii) Whether refusal by the mother to subject the child to DNA testing could justify an adverse inference of adultery against her under Illustration (h) of Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

Issue (i): Whether a DNA test of a minor child born during the subsistence of a valid marriage could be directed in the absence of a pleaded case of non-access so as to displace the conclusive presumption under Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

Analysis: Section 112 creates a conclusive presumption of legitimacy for a child born during a valid marriage, and that presumption can be displaced only by proof of non-access at the relevant time. A DNA test is not to be ordered as a matter of course, nor as an exploratory measure to enable a spouse to prove adultery. Such a direction is permissible only in exceptional cases where there is strong prima facie material, a plea of non-access, and a compelling necessity that no other evidence can resolve the controversy. The material on record did not show non-access; the husband also asserted that he had other evidence available to prove adultery. The child's privacy, identity, and best interests weighed against subjecting him to genetic testing for a collateral purpose.

Conclusion: The direction to subject the child to DNA testing was unjustified and unsustainable; this issue is decided in favour of the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether refusal by the mother to subject the child to DNA testing could justify an adverse inference of adultery against her under Illustration (h) of Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

Analysis: Illustration (h) of Section 114 concerns refusal by a person to answer a question that he or she is not compelled by law to answer, and the presumption thereunder is discretionary. It cannot be used to bypass the mandatory force of Section 112 or to convert refusal to expose a child to a DNA test into proof of the mother's adultery. The inference sought was not truly about paternity but about marital infidelity, and that could not be drawn from the mother's protective refusal acting in the child's best interests. The Court held that the husband must prove adultery by independent evidence de hors the child's paternity.

Conclusion: No adverse inference of adultery could be drawn against the appellant on her refusal to subject the child to DNA testing; this issue is decided in favour of the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The impugned orders were set aside, and the request for DNA testing was rejected, leaving the respondent free to prove the matrimonial s by other admissible evidence.

Ratio Decidendi: In matrimonial disputes, a minor child born during a valid marriage cannot be directed to undergo DNA testing merely to support allegations of adultery unless the applicant first pleads and shows non-access with strong prima facie material; refusal by the mother to expose the child to such testing cannot, by itself, found an adverse inference of adultery.

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