Customary pre-emption is a valid property burden and a reasonable restriction protecting settled ownership and possession.

Customary law of pre-emption was held to be law within Article 13 and therefore subject to fundamental-rights review, but it was not struck down. The Court treated pre-emption as an incident of property running with the land, so the vendor's title was already burdened and the purchaser acquired no absolute right free from that restriction. Enforcement of pre-emption was therefore not an unconstitutional deprivation of property under Article 19(1)(f). The Court also held that, if viewed as a restriction on the freedom to acquire, hold or dispose of property, it is a reasonable restriction in the interest of the general public because it prevents intrusion by strangers and the resulting disturbance.

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Issues: Whether the customary law of pre-emption is void under Article 13(1) read with Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution, or is protected as a reasonable restriction under Article 19(5).

Analysis: Customary law falls within the definition of law in Article 13 and may be tested against fundamental rights. The decisive question was whether the right of pre-emption is a mere personal right or an incident attached to the land. The Court held that pre-emption is an incident of property which runs with the land, so the vendor's title is already subject to that burden and the purchaser acquires no absolute right free from it. On that footing, enforcement of pre-emption does not amount to an unconstitutional deprivation of property under Article 19(1)(f). The Court further held that, even if the restriction is viewed as one on the freedom to acquire, hold, or dispose of property, it is a reasonable restriction in the interest of the general public because it serves to prevent the intrusion of strangers and the resulting inconvenience and disturbance.

Conclusion: The customary law of pre-emption is valid and constitutional and does not violate Article 19(1)(f).

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