Court dismisses writ petition challenging consent under DSPE Act, clarifies "consent" vs. "sanction" laws

The court dismissed the writ petition, ruling that the petitioner lacked locus standi to challenge the consent granted under Section 6 of the DSPE Act, 1946. The court clarified the distinction between "consent" and "sanction" under relevant laws, emphasizing that the consent in this case was administrative and did not require the same scrutiny as a sanction. It was found that the respondent No. 1 had appropriately applied its mind before granting consent based on the findings and opinion obtained. The petition was dismissed without costs.

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Issues Involved:
1. Locus standi of the petitioner to challenge the consent granted under Section 6 of the DSPE Act, 1946.
2. Nature of the consent granted under Section 6 of the DSPE Act, 1946 in comparison to sanction under Section 17A or Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 or under Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973.
3. Requirement of application of mind by the respondent No. 1 before granting consent under Section 6 of the DSPE Act, 1946.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Locus Standi of the Petitioner:
The petitioner challenged the consent granted by the respondent No. 1 under Section 6 of the DSPE Act, 1946, arguing that his name was mentioned in the Enforcement Directorate's report, thus giving him the locus standi. The court referred to the legal principle of locus standi, which requires a person to have a legal right that is violated. The court found that the petitioner's rights were not infringed by the consent order, as it was directed towards investigating violations of the PC Act, 1988 by Mr. D.K. Shivakumar and other officials of the Government of Karnataka. The reference to the petitioner was incidental. The court concluded that the petitioner did not have the locus standi to challenge the order as he failed to demonstrate any legal right that was violated.

2. Nature of the Consent under Section 6 of the DSPE Act, 1946:
The court distinguished between "consent" under Section 6 of the DSPE Act, 1946 and "sanction" under Sections 17A and 19 of the PC Act, 1988 or Section 197 of the CrPC. The court noted that "consent" is a permission granted by the State to allow the CBI to investigate within its jurisdiction, whereas "sanction" involves a detailed application of mind to ascertain if there is enough material to prosecute. The court emphasized that the impugned order used the term "sanction" incorrectly and what was actually granted was "consent." The court cited previous judgments to support the distinction, highlighting that consent under Section 6 is an administrative order and does not require the same level of scrutiny as a sanction.

3. Requirement of Application of Mind:
The court addressed whether the respondent No. 1 was required to apply its mind before granting consent under Section 6 of the DSPE Act, 1946. The court found that the respondent No. 1 had acted on the findings of the Enforcement Directorate, which indicated violations of the PC Act, 1988. The court noted that the respondent No. 1 had sought and obtained an opinion from the Advocate General, which supported the decision to grant consent. The court concluded that even if the respondent No. 1 was required to apply its mind, the circumstances and the opinion of the Advocate General indicated that it had done so. The court held that the decision to grant consent was based on subjective satisfaction and was justified.

Conclusion:
The court dismissed the writ petition, finding that the petitioner lacked locus standi, the consent granted under Section 6 of the DSPE Act, 1946 was not akin to a sanction, and the respondent No. 1 had applied its mind before granting consent. The court emphasized that the consent was an administrative order and did not require the same level of scrutiny as a sanction. The petition was dismissed with no costs.

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