Writ classification for arms licence disputes turns on the civil right affected, making civil writ procedure the proper forum.

Writ classification depends on the nature of the right infringed and the relief sought, not on the authority passing the order. A challenge to suspension, cancellation, or revocation of an arms licence concerns a statutory civil right and is therefore civil in character, even though the licensing authority acts in a quasi-judicial regulatory setting. Proceedings wrongly filed on the criminal writ side are not maintainable in that form. The proper course is to permit conversion to the civil writ jurisdiction so the matter can be considered in the correct procedural category.

---

---

Issues: (i) whether a proceeding challenging suspension or cancellation of an arms licence is to be treated as a civil proceeding or a criminal proceeding for the purpose of writ classification; (ii) whether criminal writ jurisdiction cases were maintainable against the impugned orders; and (iii) whether the petitioners should be afforded an opportunity to convert the proceedings into civil writ jurisdiction cases.

Issue (i): whether a proceeding challenging suspension or cancellation of an arms licence is to be treated as a civil proceeding or a criminal proceeding for the purpose of writ classification.

Analysis: The classification under the writ rules depends on the nature of the right infringed and the relief claimed, not on the mere character of the authority passing the order. A proceeding is civil where a statutory civil right is alleged to have been infringed and relief is sought against that infringement. The suspension, cancellation, or revocation of an arms licence under the statutory scheme affects the holder's right to retain the licence, and the authority acts in a quasi-judicial capacity under the relevant provisions. Such a proceeding is not a criminal proceeding merely because it concerns arms regulation.

Conclusion: The proceeding for suspension, cancellation, or revocation of an arms licence is a civil proceeding.

Issue (ii): whether criminal writ jurisdiction cases were maintainable against the impugned orders.

Analysis: Since the impugned matters related to civil proceedings, they could not properly be registered and pursued as criminal writ jurisdiction cases. The writ classification rules require the matter to be taken in the appropriate category, and the present proceedings did not fall within the criminal writ side.

Conclusion: The criminal writ applications were not maintainable.

Issue (iii): whether the petitioners should be afforded an opportunity to convert the proceedings into civil writ jurisdiction cases.

Analysis: Writ classification is procedural, and a litigant should not be denied relief merely on a technical mistake in categorisation. The proper course was to permit conversion so that the matters could be considered in the correct jurisdictional form.

Conclusion: The petitioners were entitled to convert the applications into civil writ jurisdiction cases within the time allowed.

Final Conclusion: The proceedings were held to be civil in nature, the criminal writ petitions were found not maintainable, and the petitioners were given an opportunity to proceed in the proper civil writ forum.

Ratio Decidendi: For writ classification, the decisive test is the nature of the right infringed and the relief sought; a proceeding affecting a statutory civil right is civil in character even if it arises from a regulatory or quasi-judicial order.

---