Pecuniary jurisdiction transfer: post-decree challenge lies to the High Court, while execution may proceed in either court.

Where the Delhi High Court Act, 1966 transferred original civil jurisdiction in suits above the pecuniary limit to the High Court, an application to set aside an ex parte decree passed by a subordinate judge before the appointed day lay only to the High Court because it was an original proceeding in relation to the suit and the subordinate court had ceased to be competent. By contrast, execution of such decrees was not displaced: under the Code of Civil Procedure, read with the Act, the court that passed the decree and the High Court could both entertain execution proceedings, giving rise to concurrent jurisdiction.

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Issues: (i) Whether an application to set aside an ex parte decree passed by a Subordinate Judge before 31 October 1966 in a suit above Rs. 25,000 lay to the original court or to the High Court after the Delhi High Court Act, 1966 came into force; (ii) Whether execution applications in such decrees could be entertained by the original court or only by the High Court after the Act came into force.

Issue (i): Whether an application to set aside an ex parte decree passed by a Subordinate Judge before 31 October 1966 in a suit above Rs. 25,000 lay to the original court or to the High Court after the Delhi High Court Act, 1966 came into force.

Analysis: The relevant scheme of the Delhi High Court Act transferred to the High Court the original civil jurisdiction in suits exceeding Rs. 25,000 and also provided that pending proceedings in subordinate courts in such suits would stand transferred. Read with Section 150 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the transfer of business meant that applications in decided suits had to be made to the court competent to try the suit if instituted after the appointed day. An application under Order 9 Rule 13 is an original civil proceeding seeking relief in relation to the suit, and once the subordinate court ceased to have pecuniary jurisdiction over such suits, it could not entertain that application.

Conclusion: The High Court alone had jurisdiction to entertain the application under Order 9 Rule 13 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Issue (ii): Whether execution applications in such decrees could be entertained by the original court or only by the High Court after the Act came into force.

Analysis: Section 38 of the Code of Civil Procedure permits execution by the court which passed the decree, and Section 37 explains that expression to include a court which has ceased to have jurisdiction to execute where jurisdiction over the subject matter has shifted. On a combined reading of the Code and Section 5(2) of the Delhi High Court Act, the original subordinate court retained power to execute decrees already passed, while the High Court also acquired jurisdiction because the business of such suits stood transferred. The provisions were construed to facilitate execution rather than obstruct it, and the result was concurrent jurisdiction for execution applications in decrees of this kind.

Conclusion: Execution applications could be entertained either by the court that originally passed the decree or by the High Court.

Final Conclusion: Applications other than execution in such decreed suits had to be moved before the High Court, but execution proceedings could be maintained before either the original court or the High Court by reason of concurrent jurisdiction.

Ratio Decidendi: Where jurisdiction over suits above a specified pecuniary limit is transferred to the High Court, post-decree applications touching the merits of the suit lie only to the court then competent to try such suits, but execution proceedings may be entertained by both the court that passed the decree and the transferee court where the statutory scheme so indicates.

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