Section 92 jurisdiction and consent challenge fail where later Delhi High Court jurisdiction prevails and fraud is not specifically pleaded.

The Delhi High Court held that for a suit under Section 92 CPC valued above Rs. 50,000, its ordinary original civil jurisdiction under Section 5(2) of the Delhi High Court Act prevailed over the earlier local rule treating the District Judge as the principal civil court of original jurisdiction. It further held that a challenge to consent for institution under Section 92 failed because the allegation of fraud was vague and unsupported by particulars, and the signing officer's designation did not by itself invalidate the consent. On the pleadings, the decree for the proposed donation was sustained, as the objections raised did not displace the limited relief sought.

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Issues: (i) whether the Delhi High Court had jurisdiction under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure to entertain the suit for a value exceeding Rs. 50,000; (ii) whether the objection to the consent granted for institution of the suit under Section 92 was maintainable; (iii) whether the suit could be decreed on the basis of the pleadings and the appellants' stand regarding the proposed donation.

Issue (i): whether the Delhi High Court had jurisdiction under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure to entertain the suit for a value exceeding Rs. 50,000;

Analysis: Section 92 requires institution in the principal civil court of original jurisdiction. Although Section 24 of the Punjab Courts Act would ordinarily make the District Judge that court in Delhi, Section 5(2) of the Delhi High Court Act, 1966, with its overriding non-obstante clause, confers ordinary original civil jurisdiction on the High Court in every suit exceeding Rs. 50,000. The High Court therefore displaced the District Judge as the principal civil court of original jurisdiction for such suits.

Conclusion: The High Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit.

Issue (ii): whether the objection to the consent granted for institution of the suit under Section 92 was maintainable;

Analysis: The challenge to consent was pleaded only in general terms, without particulars of the alleged fraud or any factual basis showing why the consent was invalid. A plea of fraud requires specific particulars, and a bare denial does not raise a triable issue. The Court also accepted that the consent order was not shown to be unauthorized merely because the officer signing described himself as Additional District Magistrate while exercising the relevant powers.

Conclusion: The appellants could not successfully deny the factum or validity of the consent.

Issue (iii): whether the suit could be decreed on the basis of the pleadings and the appellants' stand regarding the proposed donation;

Analysis: The appellants did not dispute the desirability of the proposed donation and in substance supported the scheme, though they objected to the present management. Questions about the internal constitution of the committee and alleged misuse of funds were irrelevant to the limited relief sought. The Court treated the suit as one concerned with directions regarding a public trust and held that no evidence was necessary on the pleaded legal issues.

Conclusion: The decree directing the donation was justified and the objections to the absence of issues or evidence failed.

Final Conclusion: The appeal failed in entirety, and the decree in favour of the respondents was affirmed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a later statute confers ordinary original civil jurisdiction on the High Court for suits above a specified valuation, that jurisdiction prevails over an earlier local law deeming the District Judge to be the principal civil court for purposes of Section 92; moreover, a vague allegation of fraud cannot impeach consent to sue without specific particulars.

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