Criminal contempt and paper apology: later remorse did not excuse intimidation of a judicial officer or reduce the sentence.

A scurrilous application accusing a judicial officer of corruption and aimed at intimidation constituted criminal contempt, and the later apology was treated as a formal, paper apology rather than genuine remorse. The Court held that accepting such an apology as a matter of course would undermine the law against scandalising courts and permit contempt with impunity. Protecting judicial independence, judicial morale, and freedom from fear in decision-making justified a firm response, and the sentence was not excessive or disproportionate. The apology did not absolve the contemnor, the finding of criminal contempt was upheld, and the sentence was sustained.

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Issues: Whether the appellant's tendered apology required the contempt sentence to be set aside, and whether the High Court was justified in imposing a substantive sentence for criminal contempt.

Analysis: The conduct consisted of a scurrilous application accusing the judicial officer of corruption and attempting to intimidate and harass him after the matter had already been disposed of. The apology was tendered only later, after the matter reached the Supreme Court, and was treated as a formal or paper apology rather than a genuine expression of remorse. Acceptance of such an apology as a rule would amount to granting a licence to scandalise courts and to commit contempt with impunity. The need to preserve judicial independence, judicial morale, and the ability of judges to decide matters without fear of intimidation required a firm response, and the sentence could not be regarded as excessive or disproportionate.

Conclusion: The apology did not absolve the appellant, the High Court's finding of criminal contempt was upheld, and the sentence was sustained.

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