Slavery-related succession disability barred by Act V of 1843, with the inheritance governed by the law in force when succession opened.

Act V of 1843 was construed as a remedial measure removing civil disabilities arising from slavery, and the succession was held to fall to be determined by the law in force when it opened. The Court rejected the objection that applying the Act would be impermissibly retrospective, holding instead that the statute broadly covered any person who would otherwise have taken by inheritance but for an obstacle connected with former slave status. On that construction, the exclusionary Willa rule could not sustain the claimed title, and the respondents were entitled to succeed.

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Issues: Whether Act V of 1843 barred enforcement of the claimed right of succession arising from the alleged former slave status of the deceased, so as to exclude the plaintiff's title under the rule of Willa.

Analysis: The enactment was treated as a remedial statute intended to remove disabilities arising out of slavery. The Court held that the succession had to be determined by the law in force when the succession opened, and rejected the contention that applying the Act would give it an impermissible retrospective effect. The statutory words were construed broadly to cover any person who would have taken by inheritance but for an obstacle arising from slavery, and the prohibition was held to extend to the claim founded on the exclusionary Willa rule.

Conclusion: The claimed right was barred by Act V of 1843, and the respondents were entitled to succeed.

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