2018 (11) TMI 1915 - SC - Indian Laws

Supreme Court quashes FIR & chargesheet, finding consensual relationship & abuse of process of law

The Supreme Court quashed the FIR and chargesheet against the appellant, ruling that the allegations did not constitute offenses under the relevant ... Inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure - abuse of process of court - consent vitiated by misconception of fact (Section 90 IPC) - distinction between rape and consensual sexual relationship - promise to marry and breach of promise - civil wrong versus criminal offence - prima facie satisfaction for taking cognizanceConsent vitiated by misconception of fact (Section 90 IPC) - distinction between rape and consensual sexual relationship - prima facie satisfaction for taking cognizance - Whether the allegations in the FIR and complaint, taken at their highest, disclose the offence punishable under Section 376(2)(b) IPC against the appellant. - HELD THAT: - The Court examined the factual allegations that the complainant, a widow, lived with the appellant (a medical officer) as if husband and wife, sometimes at her house and sometimes at his, after agreeing to his proposal and with an asserted promise of marriage. Applying established principles on consent - including that Section 90 IPC describes when consent is not true consent and that each case requires assessment of surrounding circumstances - the Court held that the complainant had consciously and voluntarily entered the relationship and there was tacit consent not shown to be the result of a misconception created by the appellant. Authorities were applied to distinguish cases of deceit or breach of promise to marry from rape where consent is absent; a mere unfulfilled promise or later breach, without evidence that the promise was false from inception or induced intercourse by fraudulent intention, does not convert a consensual relationship into rape. On the facts as alleged, the Court found no prima facie case of rape under Section 376(2)(b) IPC and that the complaint did not disclose the offence for which cognizance was taken. [Paras 21]Allegations do not prima facie make out an offence under Section 376(2)(b) IPC; the charge of rape cannot be sustained.Inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure - abuse of process of court - prima facie satisfaction for taking cognizance - Whether the High Court erred in refusing to quash the FIR and chargesheet where the complaint did not disclose offences under Sections 420 IPC and Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act and where continuation of proceedings would amount to abuse of process. - HELD THAT: - Drawing upon the limited and exceptional scope of Section 482 CrPC and the categories of cases where inherent jurisdiction may be exercised to prevent abuse or secure ends of justice, the Court found that the FIR and chargesheet failed to allege facts constituting the offences charged under Section 420 IPC and Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act. Given that the complaint did not prima facie disclose those offences and that the rape charge itself was unsustainable on the pleaded facts, the continuation of criminal proceedings would amount to misuse of judicial process. The High Court's dismissal of the quash petition was therefore incorrect and warranted interference in exercise of this Court's supervisory jurisdiction. [Paras 22, 23]High Court order setting aside the quash petition was erroneous; the FIR and chargesheet are to be quashed to prevent abuse of process.Final Conclusion: Appeal allowed. The FIR dated 6.12.2000 (Crime No. 59 of 2000) and the chargesheet dated 14.06.2001 against the appellant under Sections 376(2)(b), 420 read with Section 34 IPC and Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act are quashed. Issues Involved:1. Quashing of FIR and chargesheet under Sections 376(2)(b), 420 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, and Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act.2. Abuse of process of law under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.3. Distinction between consensual sex and rape under the pretext of false promise of marriage.Detailed Analysis:1. Quashing of FIR and Chargesheet:The appellant sought to quash the FIR and chargesheet filed against him under Sections 376(2)(b), 420 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, and Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act. The Supreme Court examined whether the allegations made in the FIR, even if taken at face value, constituted any offense. It was observed that the complainant and the appellant were in a consensual relationship, living together at times, and the complainant had taken a conscious decision to be in the relationship. The Court concluded that the allegations did not prima facie constitute the offense of rape under Section 376(2)(b) as the relationship was consensual and not a result of any misconception. Similarly, the FIR did not spell out any wrong committed under Section 420 of the IPC or Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act. Consequently, the Court quashed the FIR and the chargesheet.2. Abuse of Process of Law under Section 482 Cr.P.C.:The appellant contended that the criminal proceedings were initiated with mala fides and an ulterior motive, constituting an abuse of the process of law. The Court reiterated that the exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is an exception and not the rule, meant to prevent abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The Court referred to the principles laid down in previous judgments, including State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, which enumerated categories where such power could be exercised. The Court found that the present case fell within these categories as the allegations did not disclose any cognizable offense and were inherently improbable.3. Distinction Between Consensual Sex and Rape:The Court emphasized the distinction between consensual sex and rape under the pretext of a false promise of marriage. It cited several judgments, including Uday v. State of Karnataka and Deelip Singh v. State of Bihar, which held that consent obtained under a misconception of fact, particularly a false promise of marriage, could vitiate consent. However, in the present case, the complainant was aware of the appellant's marital status and differences with his wife. The relationship was consensual, and the complainant had taken a conscious decision to live with the appellant. The Court concluded that the allegations did not constitute rape as defined under Section 375 IPC, as the complainant's consent was not obtained under any misconception of fact.Conclusion:The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's order and quashing the FIR and chargesheet against the appellant. The Court held that the allegations did not constitute any offense under the relevant sections of the IPC and the SC/ST Act, and the proceedings were an abuse of the process of law. The Court's judgment reinforced the principles governing the exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and the distinction between consensual sex and rape under false promises of marriage.