Limitation, Order II Rule 2, and defective pleadings justified rejection of a plaint challenging registered sale deeds.

A plaint may be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 when the bar of law is apparent from its own averments, including limitation. On the pleaded facts, the challenge to registered sale deeds was instituted long after their execution, so limitation was visible from the plaint and rejection was justified. The suit was also treated as barred by Order II Rule 2 because the later relief arose from the same cause of action and should have been claimed earlier. The plaint further failed to satisfy the pleaded requirements for part performance under Section 53-A, readiness and willingness, and mandatory pleadings, while a bare declaration and injunction were held unsustainable where an agreement to sell created no title and further relief was available.

---

---

Issues: (i) Whether the plaint was liable to rejection under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as barred by law and limitation; (ii) Whether the suit was barred by Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; (iii) Whether the plaintiff could rely upon part performance under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 or seek injunction without showing readiness and willingness and without availing specific performance; (iv) Whether a bare declaratory suit challenging registered sale deeds was maintainable in view of Sections 34 and 41 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882; (v) Whether the plaint suffered from non-compliance of the mandatory pleading requirement under Order VI Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Issue (i): Whether the plaint was liable to rejection under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as barred by law and limitation.

Analysis: The plaint itself disclosed that the challenged sale deeds were executed and registered in 1995, whereas the suit was instituted in 2011. On the pleadings, the challenge was thus brought after a long lapse of time and the bar of limitation was apparent from the plaint. The court also treated the pleaded facts and documents as sufficient to decide the legal objection without evidence.

Conclusion: The suit was barred by limitation and the plaint was liable to rejection under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Issue (ii): Whether the suit was barred by Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Analysis: The earlier suit and the later suit arose out of the same subject matter and the same claimed rights in the suit property. The relief later sought could and should have been included in the earlier proceeding. Omission to claim that relief in the first suit attracted the prohibition against a subsequent suit on the same cause of action.

Conclusion: The subsequent suit was barred by Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Issue (iii): Whether the plaintiff could rely upon part performance under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 or seek injunction without showing readiness and willingness and without availing specific performance.

Analysis: The court held that the ingredients of Section 53-A were not satisfied on the plaint averments. There was no sufficient pleading of acts done in furtherance of the contract, and no clear pleading of readiness and willingness to perform the contract. The court also noted that the equitable protection under Section 53-A could not be used to avoid the need for the appropriate remedy of specific performance, and that equally efficacious relief had not been pursued.

Conclusion: The plaintiff could not maintain the suit on the basis of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, and the injunction-based relief was not maintainable on that footing.

Issue (iv): Whether a bare declaratory suit challenging registered sale deeds was maintainable in view of Sections 34 and 41 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.

Analysis: The agreement to sell did not create title, and the plaintiff was not shown to be the owner of the property. In that situation, the plaintiff could not challenge the title of persons claiming under registered sale deeds merely on the basis of an agreement to sell. The proviso to Section 34 barred a bare declaration where further relief was available, and Section 41 also barred injunction where an equally efficacious remedy existed. Section 54 reinforced that an agreement for sale does not of itself create any interest in immovable property.

Conclusion: The declaratory and injunctive reliefs were not maintainable, and the plaint was hit by Sections 34 and 41 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.

Issue (v): Whether the plaint suffered from non-compliance of the mandatory pleading requirement under Order VI Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Analysis: The plaint lacked the necessary specific pleadings required for the claim advanced, and the court treated this defect as a mandatory pleading lapse affecting maintainability. On that basis, the trial court was found to have erred in overlooking a pure legal defect apparent from the plaint.

Conclusion: The plaint was defective for want of mandatory pleadings and could not be sustained.

Final Conclusion: The cumulative legal objections established that the suit was barred and unsustainable on the plaint allegations, so rejection of the plaint was warranted and the revision succeeded.

Ratio Decidendi: A plaint may be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 where the bar of law is apparent from the plaint itself, including limitation, omission of necessary relief, and failure to satisfy the statutory prerequisites for declaratory, injunctive, or part-performance based relief.

---