Divorced wife maintenance rights survive unless prior mehar or settlement is a real substitute for support.

A divorced woman who has not remarried remains within the statutory definition of "wife" under Section 125 CrPC, and the welfare provision must be construed liberally to protect against destitution. On the recorded facts, the obligation to maintain was not displaced by divorce, so maintenance remained payable. A prior consent decree and mehar payment under personal or customary law can defeat a claim under Section 127(3)(b) only if the amount is a real, reasonable and adequate substitute for maintenance; a nominal or illusory payment does not extinguish the statutory right. The maintenance claim therefore survived.

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Issues: (i) whether a woman divorced by her husband and not remarried is entitled to claim maintenance under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973; (ii) whether a prior consent decree and payment of mehar could defeat or extinguish the claim under Section 127(3)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973.

Issue (i): whether a woman divorced by her husband and not remarried is entitled to claim maintenance under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973.

Analysis: The statutory explanation to Section 125(1) includes within "wife" a woman who has been divorced by, or has obtained a divorce from, her husband and has not remarried. The provision is a welfare measure and must receive a liberal and compassionate construction consistent with the constitutional commitment to protect destitute women. The condition of neglect to maintain remained satisfied on the findings recorded, and the divorce did not remove the statutory entitlement.

Conclusion: The divorced wife was entitled to maintenance under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973.

Issue (ii): whether a prior consent decree and payment of mehar could defeat or extinguish the claim under Section 127(3)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973.

Analysis: A prior settlement can bar the claim only if the amount paid under customary or personal law is a real and reasonable substitute for maintenance. A lump sum payment that is merely nominal or illusory does not extinguish the statutory right created later by Section 125. The payment must bear a rational relation to the object of preventing destitution and must substantially serve as maintenance in lieu of recurrent allowance.

Conclusion: The consent decree and mehar payment did not extinguish the maintenance claim, as the payment was not shown to be a reasonable substitute for maintenance.

Final Conclusion: The statutory protection for a divorced wife was restored, and the maintenance order in her favour stood revived.

Ratio Decidendi: A divorced wife who has not remarried remains entitled to maintenance under Section 125, and only a customary or personal law payment that is a reasonable and adequate substitute for maintenance can displace that statutory obligation under Section 127(3)(b).

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