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Issues: Whether an application for exclusive marketing right rejected before the commencement of the Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005 could be revived or governed by the transitional provision in Section 78, and whether the saved rights under Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 preserved the challenge to the rejection order.
Analysis: The claim for exclusive marketing right arose under Chapter IV-A of the Patents Act, 1970 and was rejected before the amendment came into force. Once Chapter IV-A was repealed, the effect of repeal had to be tested under Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, which saves accrued rights and pending legal proceedings unless a different intention appears. The transitional provision in Section 78 was held to operate only in respect of pending applications and not to reopen matters already concluded by rejection before the appointed day. On that construction, the earlier rejection order could still be challenged and the Division Bench erred in holding the writ petition not maintainable.
Conclusion: The bar of maintainability was not attracted, and the earlier rejection did not lose its challengeability merely because the amendment had come into force; the appeal succeeded.
Final Conclusion: The repeal of Chapter IV-A did not extinguish the appellant's right to pursue the challenge against the pre-amendment rejection order, and the decision of the Division Bench was set aside in favour of restoration of the learned Single Judge's view.
Ratio Decidendi: Unless a contrary intention appears, repeal does not destroy accrued rights or pending remedies, and a transitional provision will not be construed to reopen or exclude proceedings already concluded before the appointed day.