Issues: Whether CENVAT credit was admissible on outward transportation services received before 01.04.2008 for delivery of final products to customers under FOR destination contracts.

Analysis: Rule 2(l) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, as applicable before 01.04.2008, covered services used directly or indirectly in relation to manufacture and clearance of final products from the place of removal, and included activities relating to business. The pre-amendment definition was not to be construed restrictively as confined to the factory or depot. Under FOR destination contracts, the supplier remained responsible for delivery and retained ownership until the goods reached the buyer's premises. Admissibility of credit on outward transportation did not depend upon freight forming part of the transaction value for excise-duty purposes.

Conclusion: CENVAT credit on goods transport agency service for outward transportation up to the buyers' premises was admissible to the assessee for the period before 01.04.2008.

Issues: Whether a consolidated demand-cum-show cause notice covering multiple financial years may be issued under Sections 73 or 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: There is no statutory bar against issuance of a consolidated show cause notice for different financial years under either Section 73 or Section 74. Whether the proceedings should factually fall under Section 73 or Section 74 depends on the existence of fraud, wilful misstatement, or suppression of facts with intent to evade tax, requiring adjudication by the Proper Officer and, thereafter, the statutory appellate forums.

Conclusion: A consolidated show cause notice for multiple financial years under Sections 73 or 74 is valid; the objection to such jurisdiction fails.

Issues: Whether the petitioner may seek payment of its admitted tax liability in instalments.

Analysis: The petitioner did not dispute the liability and sought time to pay it in instalments. The statutory power to permit instalment payment lies with the Commissioner of State Tax. As no application seeking such relief was placed before the competent authority, the petitioner was directed to make an application for consideration in accordance with law.

Outcome: The writ petition was disposed of with liberty to apply to the competent authority for instalment payment.

Issues: (i) Whether a company purchasing property in its own name from its recorded corpus can be treated as a benamidar under the statutory definition; (ii) Whether acceptance of the relevant investment under income-tax assessment precludes or must be considered in benami proceedings; (iii) Whether benami findings substantially founded on a retracted third-party search statement can stand without cross-examination and without entity-specific consideration of the recorded source of funds.

Issue (i): Whether a company purchasing property in its own name from its recorded corpus can be treated as a benamidar under the statutory definition.

Analysis: Section 2(9)(A) requires affirmative proof that another person provided the consideration and that the property is held for that person's immediate or future benefit. Corporate status does not immunise a company from being a benamidar. The initial and continuing burden remains on the Initiating Officer to establish the statutory conditions through credible material; a source-of-source inquiry permits investigation but not presumption or reversal of that burden.

Conclusion: A company may be a benamidar if the statutory conditions and the relevant indicia of a benami transaction are established; its corporate character and recorded ownership alone are not conclusive.

Issue (ii): Whether acceptance of the relevant investment under income-tax assessment precludes or must be considered in benami proceedings.

Analysis: Section 69 addresses unrecorded and unexplained investment, whereas Section 2(9)(A) concerns real ownership and beneficial enjoyment. Therefore, the two enactments operate independently and an assessment finding does not automatically determine benami ownership. However, the subsequent assessment specifically accepted the same investment, banking trail, loans and advances as explained. That finding had material evidentiary bearing on the alleged routing of unexplained funds and required consideration by the benami authority.

Conclusion: Acceptance under Section 69 does not bar benami proceedings, but the assessment findings must be considered when determining whether the statutory ingredients of a benami transaction are proved.

Issue (iii): Whether benami findings substantially founded on a retracted third-party search statement can stand without cross-examination and without entity-specific consideration of the recorded source of funds.

Analysis: The alleged cash routing rested substantially on the retracted statement of a third party recorded in income-tax search proceedings. No effective opportunity was given to test that foundational statement by cross-examination, despite a specific request. No independent money trail, cash deposit, or financial instrument was identified linking the alleged beneficial owner's funds to the properties. Further, the authorities did not deal with the documented explanation that the company's reserves pre-dated the alleged beneficial owner's entry and that the purchases were funded by redeployment of loans and advances. In proceedings carrying confiscatory and penal consequences, a foundational and retracted statement cannot support an adverse finding without a fair opportunity to test it and meaningful examination of the material explanation.

Conclusion: The findings were vitiated by breach of natural justice and by failure to examine material evidence concerning the source and vintage of the funds; a fresh fact-finding exercise is required.

Final Conclusion: The statutory requirements for establishing benami ownership remain open for determination upon a lawful reconsideration of the assessment findings, the source explanation, and any reliance on the retracted statement after affording the required procedural safeguards.

Ratio Decidendi: A retracted third-party statement that forms the foundational basis of a benami finding cannot be relied upon without affording a meaningful opportunity of cross-examination, particularly where independent evidence does not establish the consideration-provider and beneficial ownership required by Section 2(9)(A).

Issues: Whether the pending representations seeking provisional release of seized imported goods and seized currency should be considered and decided by the proper customs officer.

Analysis: The representations for provisional release remained pending before the proper officer. The respondents accepted that they would be decided in accordance with law. No merits of the seizure, release claim, or challenge to the subsequent seizure memorandum were adjudicated. The petitioner was permitted to supplement the pending representation, was entitled to advance notice and an opportunity of hearing, and the proper officer was directed to issue a reasoned decision within the stipulated period.

Conclusion: The proper officer must hear and decide the representations for provisional release by a reasoned order within three weeks; the merits of the parties' rival contentions remain open.

Issues: (i) Whether dilution of duty-paid styrene butadiene latex with water, addition of preservative, and repacking under different brand names amounted to manufacture; (ii) Whether the Department could adopt a contrary position for subsequent periods after accepting that the same process did not amount to manufacture for earlier periods.

Issue (i): Whether dilution of duty-paid styrene butadiene latex with water, addition of preservative, and repacking under different brand names amounted to manufacture.

Analysis: Under Section 2(f), manufacture requires transformation resulting in a new and distinct article having a distinct name, character or use. The test material showed that the input latex and the diluted, preservative-added products had the same chemical characteristics. Their uses remained akin, and dilution, branding and repacking did not bring into existence a commercially distinct product. The prior adjudication and Tribunal decisions concerning the same products and process had also reached this conclusion.

Conclusion: The process did not amount to manufacture and no fresh central excise duty was chargeable on the resultant products. The finding is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the Department could adopt a contrary position for subsequent periods after accepting that the same process did not amount to manufacture for earlier periods.

Analysis: The earlier Tribunal decisions concerning the assessee and its other unit had attained finality because they were not challenged. Those decisions had conclusively found that the identical process did not result in manufacture. No material distinction or new evidence justified departure from that accepted position for the subsequent period.

Conclusion: The Department could not take a contrary view for the subsequent periods on the same facts and issue. The finding is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The impugned order dropping the excise-duty proceedings was sustained because the processing did not create a new excisable product and the previously accepted legal position remained binding for identical subsequent transactions.

Ratio Decidendi: Mere dilution, addition of preservative, branding and repacking of duty-paid goods do not constitute manufacture unless they result in a new article with a distinct name, character or use; the Department cannot depart from an unchallenged settled position on identical facts for another period.

Issues: Whether the applicant was entitled to bail in prosecution for alleged fraudulent availment and passing of input tax credit under the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: The investigation had concluded and the complaint had been filed; no criminal antecedents, likelihood of absconding, witness intimidation, or evidence tampering was established. The alleged offences are triable by a Magistrate and carry a maximum imprisonment of five years. Continued pre-trial detention, where the trial was not likely to conclude within a reasonable period, was inconsistent with the presumption of innocence, personal liberty, and the principle that bail is the rule while jail is an exception. The documentary and electronic nature of the evidence also reduced the apprehension of interference with the prosecution.

Conclusion: The applicant was entitled to bail, subject to conditions securing attendance at trial and protecting the evidence and witnesses.

Issues: Whether the writ jurisdiction should be exercised despite an efficacious statutory appeal where the challenge concerns jurisdiction, the reasonable period for issuance of a notice under Section 76, and factual issues arising from an adjudication order.

Analysis: The statutory appellate remedy is comprehensive and extends to examining the interpretation and application of the expression "reasonable period", which depends upon the facts of each case. The contention that only Section 76 applied to certain financial years, as well as the factual questions concerning alleged wrongful availment of input tax credit and non-payment of tax, can also be considered in appellate proceedings. The adjudication order was passed after considering the reply and affording an opportunity of hearing.

Conclusion: The writ petition was not entertained because the available statutory appeal can adjudicate the jurisdictional, limitation-related and factual questions raised by the petitioner.

Issues: Whether Extra Duty Deposit collected pending finalisation of assessment in related-party imports is customs duty subject to the limitation for refund.

Analysis: Extra Duty Deposit is a security collected pending final assessment or valuation verification, not a statutory customs levy. It remains available for appropriation only if an additional duty liability emerges. Where final assessment accepts the declared transaction value and finds no additional duty payable, the basis for retaining the deposit ceases. The refund limitation applicable to customs duty does not govern return of such a deposit.

Conclusion: Extra Duty Deposit is not customs duty, and its refund after final assessment is not barred by the limitation prescribed for refund of duty. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether Social Welfare Surcharge is payable where Basic Customs Duty is fully exempt on imports made against MEIS/SEIS duty credit scrips under the applicable customs exemption notifications.

Analysis: Social Welfare Surcharge is calculated as a percentage of the aggregate customs duties payable. The applicable departmental clarification provides that, where the aggregate customs duty is nil because of an exemption, the surcharge is also nil and cannot be calculated on a notional Basic Customs Duty. The prior ruling on identical imports and exemption notifications was applicable.

Conclusion: Social Welfare Surcharge is not payable when Basic Customs Duty is exempt under Notification No. 24/2015-Customs dated 08.04.2015 and Notification No. 25/2015-Customs dated 08.04.2015; the assessee is entitled to consequential refund relief.

Issues: (i) Whether restoration of funds dealt with during the CIRP could be directed under Sections 14 and 60(5) despite no adjudication of fraudulent or wrongful trading under Section 66; (ii) Whether the direction to forward the matter for action under Section 74 survived.

Issue (i): Whether restoration of funds dealt with during the CIRP could be directed under Sections 14 and 60(5) despite no adjudication of fraudulent or wrongful trading under Section 66.

Analysis: The application invoked Sections 66, 74 and 60(5) and specifically sought reversal and restoration of funds withdrawn in breach of the moratorium. Sections 14 and 17 independently preserve the corporate debtor's assets during CIRP by prohibiting dealings with those assets and vesting management in the resolution professional. Section 60(5), supplemented by Rule 11, authorises consequential directions concerning questions arising from CIRP. Restoration of funds is distinct from civil liability for fraudulent or wrongful trading under Section 66. The sale of the corporate debtor's mortgaged property during moratorium, despite refusal of permission to sell it, and the unsubstantiated explanation for withdrawals supported the restoration direction.

Conclusion: The restoration direction was validly made under Sections 14 and 60(5), independently of Section 66, against the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether the direction to forward the matter for action under Section 74 survived.

Analysis: Section 74 was omitted by the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2026 with effect from 26 May 2026.

Conclusion: The direction concerning action under Section 74 had become infructuous.

Final Conclusion: The corporate debtor's insolvency estate remains protected through restoration of amounts dealt with in violation of the CIRP moratorium, while no action can proceed under the omitted provision.

Ratio Decidendi: A direction restoring corporate debtor assets improperly dealt with during moratorium is independently sustainable under Sections 14 and 60(5) and does not require proof of fraudulent or wrongful trading under Section 66.

Issues: (i) Whether purchasers of coal are liable to pay Clean Energy Cess payable on removal of coal; (ii) Whether purchasers of confiscated coal are liable to penalty in the absence of a finding that they knew or had reason to believe that the coal was liable to confiscation.

Issue (i): Whether purchasers of coal are liable to pay Clean Energy Cess payable on removal of coal.

Analysis: The Clean Energy Cess Rules, 2010 impose registration and payment obligations upon the producer of specified goods, namely raw coal, raw lignite and raw peat, and require cess to be paid upon their removal. The appellants were tea-producing entities that had merely purchased coal and were not producers of coal.

Conclusion: The purchasers were not liable to pay Clean Energy Cess on the coal purchased by them. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether purchasers of confiscated coal are liable to penalty in the absence of a finding that they knew or had reason to believe that the coal was liable to confiscation.

Analysis: Rule 25 of the Central Excise Rules, 2002 applies to specified categories including producers, manufacturers, warehouse registrants and registered dealers, which did not include the appellants. Under Rule 26, penalty against a person dealing with goods liable to confiscation requires knowledge or reason to believe that the goods were so liable. No definite finding established such knowledge or reason to believe on the part of the appellants.

Conclusion: No penalty was payable by the purchasers for release of the confiscated coal, and the penalty amounts paid were required to be returned. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The impugned orders were set aside insofar as they imposed penalty upon the purchasers for release of confiscated raw coal.

Ratio Decidendi: A purchaser dealing with excisable goods cannot be penalised under Rule 26 unless a finding establishes that the purchaser knew or had reason to believe that the goods were liable to confiscation; cess on removal of coal is payable by its producer, not its purchaser.

Issues: Whether cancellation of GST registration and the consequential appellate order could stand where the cancellation was made without reasons or application of mind and without an effective opportunity to respond.

Analysis: Cancellation of registration adversely affects the right to carry on business and must satisfy the constitutional requirement of non-arbitrariness under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The cancellation order did not disclose reasons warranting such action and reflected no application of mind. The petitioner was consequently entitled to submit a reply to the show-cause notice and have its defence considered after an opportunity of hearing.

Conclusion: The cancellation and appellate orders were unsustainable and were set aside in favour of the assessee, with fresh adjudication to follow after receipt of the petitioner's reply and hearing.

Issues: Whether the applicant was entitled to bail for alleged fraudulent availment and passing of input tax credit and wrongful export refunds under the Central Goods and Services Tax regime.

Analysis: The alleged offences carry a maximum sentence of five years and are triable by a Magistrate. Investigation had concluded, the complaint had been filed, no charge had been framed, and the trial was unlikely to conclude within a reasonable time. The applicant had remained in custody since 13 February 2026 and had no criminal antecedents. Pre-conviction detention is not punitive; personal liberty, the presumption of innocence, and the right to a speedy trial require release unless exceptional circumstances justify continued custody. No material established a flight risk, likelihood of repetition of offences, intimidation of witnesses, or tampering with documentary and electronic evidence.

Conclusion: The applicant made out a case for release on bail upon appropriate safeguards.

Issues: Whether the accused was entitled to bail pending trial in a case alleging fraudulent availment of input tax credit and allied forgery offences.

Analysis: The period of the alleged incorrect input-tax-credit claims, the delay in lodging the FIR, the suo motu cancellation of GST registration against which an appeal remained pending, and the period of incarceration supported release on bail. The merits of the prosecution case were left untouched.

Conclusion: The accused was entitled to bail pending trial.

Issues: (i) Whether the prohibition on sugar exports under the impugned notification was arbitrary, unconstitutional, or amenable to interference in writ jurisdiction; (ii) Whether pre-existing private export contracts, advance remittances, or allocated export quotas entitled the petitioners to export sugar despite the prohibition.

Issue (i): Whether the prohibition on sugar exports under the impugned notification was arbitrary, unconstitutional, or amenable to interference in writ jurisdiction.

Analysis: The export-policy change from restricted to prohibited was issued under the Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992 following deliberations concerning a material decline in domestic sugar production, required closing stock, domestic availability, and price stability. The quota-allocation notifications under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 and the export-policy notification under the Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992 operated in distinct statutory fields and for distinct purposes. A policy decision founded on public interest is not subject to judicial interference merely because it adversely affects commercial interests, absent arbitrariness, perversity, mala fides, or irrationality. The prohibition operated prospectively and constituted a reasonable restriction in view of the essential nature of sugar and the public-interest objective.

Conclusion: The export prohibition was a valid, non-arbitrary policy decision and did not violate Articles 14 or 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India; no writ interference was warranted. The finding is against the petitioners.

Issue (ii): Whether pre-existing private export contracts, advance remittances, or allocated export quotas entitled the petitioners to export sugar despite the prohibition.

Analysis: Private bilateral contracts and receipt of advance payment could not override the export prohibition. Under the transitional arrangement in the Foreign Trade Policy, 2023, post-restriction exports required an Irrevocable Commercial Letter of Credit existing before the restriction and its prescribed registration; the petitioners did not meet those requirements. Nor did they establish that their consignments had entered the physical export pipeline through the prescribed conditions or clearance for exportation. Export quotas allocated to sugar mills did not create vested rights in merchant exporters. The plea of promissory estoppel lacked supporting pleadings and material, while legitimate expectation is not an enforceable right capable of preventing a subsequent public-interest policy change. The rejection of the representation in the lead matter was also not challenged.

Conclusion: Pre-existing contracts, advance payments, and quota allocations did not confer an enforceable right to export sugar after the prohibition. The finding is against the petitioners.

Final Conclusion: The public-interest export-control regime prevailed over the petitioners' asserted commercial expectations; the petitioners may deal with retained sugar in the domestic market in accordance with applicable law.

Ratio Decidendi: A valid export-policy restriction adopted in supervening public interest cannot be defeated by private commercial arrangements, advance payments, quota allocations, or unenforceable expectations where the prescribed transitional and export-clearance conditions are not fulfilled.