Quasi-judicial permit decisions cannot be controlled by executive directions when assessing rival stage carriage claims.

Stage carriage permit applications had to be assessed by the transport authority in a quasi-judicial manner on an unfettered evaluation of competing claims. Section 43A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 permitted State directions only for administrative functions, not to control quasi-judicial decision-making. Because the Tribunal treated the Government Order as a governing standard and used it to influence preference between rival claims, the determination was vitiated. The High Court was therefore right to quash the Tribunal's order and require reconsideration without being bound by the impugned Government Order.

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Issues: Whether the State Transport Appellate Tribunal could rely upon the Government Order in assessing rival claims for stage carriage permits, and whether the High Court was right in quashing the Tribunal's order and directing reconsideration outside the ambit of that Government Order.

Analysis: The statutory scheme required the transport authority to decide applications for permits in a quasi-judicial manner on an unfettered assessment of the competing claims. Section 43A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 empowered the State Government to issue directions only in relation to administrative functions and not to control quasi-judicial adjudication. The Tribunal not only referred to the Government Order as a basis for preference but also applied it as a governing standard while evaluating the claims. Once an executive direction is used to influence the merits of a judicial or quasi-judicial determination, the decision stands vitiated.

Conclusion: The High Court was correct in holding that the permits had to be decided without being constrained by the impugned Government Order, and the appeal failed.

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