Court rules against defendants, upholds plaintiffs' appeal on sports development fee for Life Members.

National Sports Club of India and Ors. Versus Nandlal Dwarkadas Chhabria and Ors.

National Sports Club of India and Ors. Versus Nandlal Dwarkadas Chhabria and Ors. - TMI Issues Involved:
1. Maintainability of the suit under Order 1, Rule 8 C.P.C.
2. Powers of the Club to levy fees and subscriptions on Life Members.
3. Bar of limitation on the declaratory relief.
4. Bar of limitation on the permanent injunction.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Maintainability of the Suit under Order 1, Rule 8 C.P.C.
The appellants contended that the suit should have been filed in a representative capacity under Order 1, Rule 8 C.P.C., as it involved the rights of all Life Members. However, the court noted that the plaintiffs had initially filed the suit in a representative capacity but later claimed relief only for themselves. The court held that an individual can file a suit to protect their right, even if it happens to affect many persons. Order 1, Rule 8 C.P.C. is an enabling provision allowing one person to sue on behalf of others with the court's leave but does not mandate that a suit involving public rights must be filed in a representative capacity. Therefore, the suit was maintainable even though it was not filed under Order 1, Rule 8 C.P.C.

2. Powers of the Club to Levy Fees and Subscriptions on Life Members
The court examined the resolutions passed by the Executive Committee and the Regional Committee of the Club, which authorized the collection of a sports development fee of Rs. 60 per annum from all members. The court scrutinized Rule 6 of the Club's Rules and Regulations, which states that Life Members enrolled before 1-10-1977 are not liable to pay any annual or local subscription. The court emphasized that the Club cannot bypass this prohibition by labeling the subscription as a development fee. Rule 27 allows the levy of fees and charges for amenities and services provided by the Club, but these must be specific and applicable only to members who utilize those services. The court concluded that the levy of a vague development fee without specifying the amenities or services was not permissible under Rule 27. Rule 22, which allows the Executive Committee to alter fees and subscriptions, applies only to new members and not to Life Members enrolled before 1-10-1977. Thus, the Club had no power to levy the sports development fee on the plaintiffs.

3. Bar of Limitation on the Declaratory Relief
The trial court had held that the declaratory relief was barred by limitation under Article 58 of the Limitation Act, which prescribes a three-year period from when the cause of action first accrues. The plaintiffs argued that the cause of action arose only when their rights as members were effectively threatened in 1995, not when the resolution was passed in 1986. The court agreed, noting that the Club had not taken any action to enforce the resolution until 1995. The right to sue accrues when there is a clear and unequivocal threat to one's rights. The court found that the plaintiffs' rights were first effectively threatened in 1995 when the Club demanded payment and denied the first plaintiff's daughter a duplicate identity card. Therefore, the suit for declaratory relief was within the limitation period.

4. Bar of Limitation on the Permanent Injunction
The appellants argued that the relief of permanent injunction was consequential to the declaratory relief and should also be barred by limitation. However, the court noted that the reliefs of declaration and injunction are independent of each other. The right to seek an injunction arises when there is an actual or threatened interference with the plaintiffs' rights. Given that the plaintiffs' rights were first threatened in 1995, the suit for permanent injunction was also within the limitation period.

Conclusion:
The court dismissed the appeal by the defendants (First Appeal No. 1618/96) and allowed the appeal by the plaintiffs (First Appeal No. 1625/96). It declared that the Club had no right to levy the sports development fee on Life Members enrolled before 1-10-1977 and could not terminate their memberships or interfere with their rights for non-payment of this fee. The court directed both parties to bear their respective costs in the appeal and the suit.