Equity of redemption and insolvency protection: pledged rights were not treated as goods, and the second charge remained valid.

An equity of redemption remaining after a pledge was treated as an intangible right, not "goods" within the order and disposition clause, because that clause applies to visible or tangible property capable of possession and manual delivery. The second charge therefore was not avoided under Section 52(1)(c) of the Insolvency Act. A separate challenge based on relation back also failed: Section 57(c) of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act protected the second charge as a transfer for valuable consideration made before adjudication, and there was no proof that the transferee had notice of insolvency or lacked bona fides. The appeal failed and the insolvency judgment was affirmed.

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Issues: (i) whether an equity of redemption in pledged goods is "goods" within the order and disposition clause so as to attract Section 52(1)(c) of the Insolvency Act; (ii) whether the second charge was invalid because an earlier act of insolvency related back to the date of the charge, or because the transferee had notice so as to fall outside Section 57(c) of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act.

Issue (i): whether an equity of redemption in pledged goods is "goods" within the order and disposition clause so as to attract Section 52(1)(c) of the Insolvency Act.

Analysis: The charge holders had, at most, an intangible equity remaining after the earlier pledge. The order and disposition clause was treated as applying to visible or tangible goods capable of possession and manual delivery, not to incorporeal rights or choses in action. Since a pledgee's possession is not the possession of the pawnor, the equity of redemption retained by the insolvent was not itself "goods" within the clause.

Conclusion: The contention failed and the second charge was not avoided under Section 52(1)(c) of the Insolvency Act.

Issue (ii): whether the second charge was invalid because an earlier act of insolvency related back to the date of the charge, or because the transferee had notice so as to fall outside Section 57(c) of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act.

Analysis: Although an earlier transfer had been treated as an act of insolvency, Section 57(c) protected a transfer for valuable consideration made before adjudication if the other party had no notice of the insolvency petition. The debt secured by the second charge was an existing debt, and no evidence showed notice or want of bona fides in the relevant statutory sense.

Conclusion: The second charge was valid under Section 57(c) of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act and was not displaced by relation back.

Final Conclusion: The appeal failed in full, and the judgment in insolvency was affirmed.

Ratio Decidendi: An equitable interest remaining after a pledge is not "goods" for the order and disposition clause, and a pre-adjudication transfer for valuable consideration remains protected unless statutory notice is shown.

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