1981 (1) TMI 291 - SC - Indian Laws

Supreme Court Reverses High Court Decision on Election Petition Appeal

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment, and dismissed the election petition. The Court held that the appellant's ... Disqualification for being chosen - retrospective effect of acquittal on conviction and disqualification - grounds for declaring an election to be void under Section 100(1) - Clause (a) and Clause (d)(i)/(iv) - date of scrutiny of nominations as the decisive date under Section 36(2)(a) - improper acceptance of nomination - application of the ratio in Manni Lal v. Parmai LalRetrospective effect of acquittal on conviction and disqualification - grounds for declaring an election to be void under Section 100(1) - Clause (a) - application of the ratio in Manni Lal v. Parmai Lal - Effect of appellate acquittal, given before the High Court decided the election petition, on a returned candidate's conviction and consequent disqualification when the election is challenged under Section 100(1)(a). - HELD THAT: - The Court applied the principle that an order of acquittal on merits operates retrospectively, wiping out the conviction and sentence from their inception. As held in Manni Lal v. Parmai Lal, when an appellate court allows an appeal and acquits a returned candidate before the election-petition is decided, the conviction (and the disqualification under Section 8(2)) is treated as having been vacated with retrospective effect. The opinion the High Court must form under Section 100(1) is formed at the time of pronouncing judgment; if the Court has before it an appellate acquittal that operates retroactively, the factual disqualification ceases to exist for purposes of deciding whether the returned candidate was disqualified on the date of his election. [Paras 31, 33]An appellate acquittal pronounced before the High Court's decision in an election petition retrospectively annuls the conviction and the disqualification, thereby defeating a challenge under Section 100(1)(a).Date of scrutiny of nominations as the decisive date under Section 36(2)(a) - improper acceptance of nomination - grounds for declaring an election to be void under Section 100(1) - Clause (d)(i)/(iv) - retrospective effect of acquittal on conviction and disqualification - Whether the principle that an appellate acquittal wipes out conviction applies to a challenge under Section 100(1)(d)(i)/(iv) that alleges improper acceptance of the returned candidate's nomination because he was disqualified at the date of scrutiny. - HELD THAT: - Although Section 36(2)(a) makes the date of scrutiny the relevant date to judge disqualification for the purpose of objections to nominations, the Court held that the central question in a Clause (d)(i)/(iv) challenge-whether the candidate was disqualified at the date of scrutiny-must be answered by the same legal principle governing Clause (a). Where the conviction that constituted the disqualification was set aside by appellate acquittal before the High Court decided the election petition, that acquittal retrospectively obliterates the disqualification even at the date of scrutiny. Consequently, the allegation of improper acceptance founded on a disqualification that has been retrospectively wiped out cannot succeed. [Paras 34, 35]The retrospective effect of an appellate acquittal applies equally to challenges under Section 100(1)(d)(i)/(iv); therefore the nomination was not improperly accepted once the conviction was set aside prior to the High Court's decision.Improper acceptance of nomination - application of the ratio in Manni Lal v. Parmai Lal - Validity of the Returning Officer's acceptance of the appellant's nomination in light of the appellate acquittal. - HELD THAT: - Because the appellate court acquitted the appellant before the High Court pronounced judgment in the election-petition, the disqualification that allegedly existed at the date of scrutiny ceased to exist in law. The primary question for the High Court-whether the appellant was disqualified at the date of scrutiny-therefore had to be answered in the negative. On that basis, the Returning Officer's acceptance of the nomination could not be characterised as improper. [Paras 34, 39]The Returning Officer properly accepted the appellant's nomination; the election-petition based on alleged improper acceptance must fail.Final Conclusion: The appeal is allowed. Applying the ratio in Manni Lal, the appellate acquittal, rendered before the High Court decided the election-petition, retrospectively wiped out the conviction and the statutory disqualification even as at the date of scrutiny, so the nomination was properly accepted and the challenge under Section 100(1)(d)(i)/(iv) fails; the High Court's order is set aside and the election-petition is dismissed. Issues Involved:1. Validity of the appellant's election under the Representation of the People Act, 1951.2. Effect of subsequent acquittal on disqualification due to conviction and sentence.3. Applicability of Section 100(1)(a) versus Section 100(1)(d)(i) of the Act.4. Interpretation of the term 'disqualified' under the Act and the Constitution.5. Impact of the date of scrutiny of nominations on the disqualification.Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:1. Validity of the appellant's election under the Representation of the People Act, 1951:The primary question was whether the election of a candidate, whose conviction and sentence exceeding two years were pending appeal at the time of nomination scrutiny, could be declared void under Section 100(1) of the Act. The High Court of Madhya Pradesh had declared the appellant's election void, leading to this appeal.2. Effect of subsequent acquittal on disqualification due to conviction and sentence:The appellant was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment exceeding two years. However, his conviction was quashed by the Supreme Court during the pendency of the election petition. The Court held that the acquittal retrospectively wiped out the conviction and sentence, making it as if the conviction never existed. This principle was supported by the precedent in Manni Lal v. Parmai Lal, where it was stated, 'An order of acquittal particularly one passed on merits wipes off the conviction and sentence for all purposes, and as effectively as if it had never been passed.'3. Applicability of Section 100(1)(a) versus Section 100(1)(d)(i) of the Act:The respondent initially challenged the election under both Section 100(1)(a) and Section 100(1)(d)(i). However, during arguments, the challenge under Section 100(1)(a) was given up, and the case was pressed only under Section 100(1)(d)(i). The Court noted that the primary question was whether the appellant was disqualified at the date of scrutiny of the nomination papers, which would determine if his nomination was properly accepted by the Returning Officer.4. Interpretation of the term 'disqualified' under the Act and the Constitution:The Court examined the definition of 'disqualified' under Section 7(b) of the Act and Article 102 of the Constitution. It was argued that the term 'disqualified' should be interpreted to include the entire election process, from nomination to the declaration of results. However, the Court held that the disqualification must be judged with reference to the date of the election, as per Section 67A, which defines the date of election as the date on which a candidate is declared elected.5. Impact of the date of scrutiny of nominations on the disqualification:The Court emphasized that under Section 36(2)(a), the crucial date for determining disqualification is the date of scrutiny of nominations. However, it concluded that the subsequent acquittal of the appellant by the Supreme Court during the pendency of the election petition retrospectively annulled the disqualification, making it non-existent even at the date of scrutiny. The Court stated, 'The acquittal of the appellant before the decision of the election-petition pending in the High Court, had, with retrospective effect, made his disqualification non-existent, even at the date of the scrutiny of nominations.'Conclusion:The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court, and dismissed the election petition of the respondent. The Court held that the appellant's subsequent acquittal retrospectively wiped out his disqualification, rendering his nomination valid. The parties were directed to bear their own costs.