Insolvency notice may rest on statutory debt adjudication; recovery legislation does not oust insolvency proceedings absent inconsistency.

An insolvency notice under the Presidency-Towns Insolvency Act, 1909 could be founded on an adjudication and recovery certificate issued under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 because the phrase "decree or order" in Section 9(2) was not confined to a civil court decree. The court rejected importing Civil Procedure Code definitions to narrow that language. It further held that the 1993 Act did not bar insolvency proceedings: insolvency is a proceeding in rem for the benefit of creditors as a class, and the special recovery code operated on a different plane without direct inconsistency. The insolvency notice was therefore sustained.

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Issues: (i) Whether an insolvency notice could validly be issued under Section 9(2) of the Presidency-Towns Insolvency Act, 1909 on the basis of an order and recovery certificate made under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993; (ii) Whether the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 excluded or barred recourse to insolvency proceedings by reason of its exclusive jurisdiction and overriding effect.

Issue (i): Whether an insolvency notice could validly be issued under Section 9(2) of the Presidency-Towns Insolvency Act, 1909 on the basis of an order and recovery certificate made under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993.

Analysis: The expression "decree or order" in Section 9(2) was held to be unqualified by the words "of any Court". The adjudication made by the Debt Recovery Tribunal determined the liability for payment of money and the recovery certificate was treated as a procedural step in execution, not as the sole source of enforceability. The Court rejected the attempt to confine the statutory language by importing the definitions in Sections 2(2) and 2(14) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Conclusion: Yes. An order adjudicating liability under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 was held sufficient to sustain an insolvency notice under Section 9(2) of the Presidency-Towns Insolvency Act, 1909.

Issue (ii): Whether the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 excluded or barred recourse to insolvency proceedings by reason of its exclusive jurisdiction and overriding effect.

Analysis: The Court held that insolvency proceedings are proceedings in rem and are meant for the benefit of creditors as a class, unlike individual recovery proceedings. The special recovery mechanism under Sections 19, 25 and 34 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 did not create an inconsistency with insolvency law, because the latter operates on a different plane and is not merely a private execution remedy. The overriding clause did not displace the insolvency jurisdiction.

Conclusion: No. The Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 did not bar insolvency proceedings under Section 9(2) of the Presidency-Towns Insolvency Act, 1909.

Final Conclusion: The motion challenging the insolvency notice failed, and the insolvency notice was sustained as a valid step in aid of a class remedy in insolvency.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a statute permits a creditor to act on a "decree or order" without limiting those words to a civil court decree, an adjudication of liability by a statutory tribunal may support insolvency proceedings, and a special recovery code does not oust a separate proceeding in rem absent direct inconsistency.

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