Pendency of criminal proceedings alone cannot justify refusal of foreign travel where bail and undertaking to return are in place.

Pendency of a corruption case and a bail-cancellation application, by itself, was not treated as sufficient reason to refuse a limited request to travel abroad when the petitioner was on bail and no interim adverse order had been passed in the cancellation proceedings. The Court relied on the presumption of innocence and the principle that an undertaking to return should ordinarily be accepted unless concrete material shows a risk of breach. As the refusal order did not properly address these considerations, it was set aside and permission to travel abroad for one month was granted subject to an undertaking and security to the trial Judge's satisfaction.

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Issues: Whether permission to travel abroad for a month could be refused merely because a corruption case and a bail-cancellation application were pending against the petitioner, and whether the impugned order deserved interference in exercise of inherent powers.

Analysis: The record showed that the petitioner was on bail and that no interim adverse order had been secured in the cancellation proceedings. The pendency of a criminal case, by itself, was held not to justify denial of permission to travel abroad, particularly when the petitioner sought leave for a limited period and was willing to furnish an undertaking to return and face trial. The Court also relied on the presumption of innocence and the principle that a person should ordinarily be presumed to abide by an undertaking unless concrete material indicates otherwise. Since the refusal order did not properly consider these aspects, it was found unsustainable.

Conclusion: The impugned order was set aside and the petitioner was permitted to go abroad for one month on furnishing an undertaking to return and on providing security to the satisfaction of the trial Judge.

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