Co-accused confession cannot sustain conviction unless Section 30 conditions are met and independent evidence supports guilt.

A co-accused's confession can be considered under Section 30 of the Evidence Act only when more than one person is tried jointly for the same offence; a confession made by a separately tried accused is outside that rule. Even where admissible, such a confession is not substantive evidence and can only provide assurance to independent reliable evidence already proving guilt. A conviction for dacoity based solely on a separately tried co-accused's confession was therefore unsustainable, and relief was granted to the appellant.

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Issues: Whether a conviction for dacoity could be sustained solely on the confession of a co-accused who was not tried jointly with the appellant, and whether such confession was admissible or usable under Section 30 of the Evidence Act.

Analysis: Section 30 of the Evidence Act permits the court to take into consideration a confession only when more persons than one are being tried jointly for the same offence. A confession of a person tried separately does not satisfy that condition. Even where Section 30 applies, a co-accused's confession is not substantive evidence and can only lend assurance to other reliable evidence already establishing guilt. It cannot be the foundation of conviction, cannot fill gaps in the prosecution case, and cannot by itself sustain a finding of guilt where no other substantive evidence exists.

Conclusion: The conviction based solely on the separately tried co-accused's confession was illegal and unsustainable, and the appellant was entitled to relief.

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