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Issues: (i) Whether the repeal of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 by the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 entitled the accused to the benefit of the later and more lenient punishment regime; (ii) whether the High Court could remit the matter against the company without giving it an opportunity of hearing under Section 401(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; (iii) whether prosecution of the nominated officer could proceed in the absence of proper arraignment of the company under the law relating to offences by companies.
Issue (i): Whether the repeal of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 by the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 entitled the accused to the benefit of the later and more lenient punishment regime.
Analysis: The saving provision in Section 97 of the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 preserved previous prosecutions, liabilities, penalties and punishments incurred under the repealed enactment and permitted their continuation as if the repealing Act had not been passed. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 was also applied consistently with that saving intent. The later statute therefore did not displace the punishment already attracted under the repealed law merely because the later regime was more lenient.
Conclusion: The accused was not entitled to the benefit of the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 for offences committed under the repealed Act.
Issue (ii): Whether the High Court could remit the matter against the company without giving it an opportunity of hearing under Section 401(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
Analysis: Section 401(2) bars an order to the prejudice of an accused or other person unless an opportunity of hearing has been afforded. Since the remand order operated to the prejudice of the company, an order of that nature could not be sustained in the absence of notice and hearing.
Conclusion: The remand order against the company was unsustainable for want of compliance with Section 401(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
Issue (iii): Whether prosecution of the nominated officer could proceed in the absence of proper arraignment of the company under the law relating to offences by companies.
Analysis: Liability under the statutory scheme governing offences by companies depends upon the company being before the court, because the nominated person's liability is linked to the offence by the company. The discussion of the company-liability framework and the requirement of strict adherence to the statutory text was treated as central to the validity of the proceedings.
Conclusion: The company-linked prosecution issue was decided against sustaining the remand direction as framed.
Final Conclusion: The decision preserved the old Act prosecution from the effect of repeal, while setting aside the remand direction made against the company without hearing, and treated the company-related prosecution requirement as a mandatory condition under the statutory scheme.
Ratio Decidendi: Where a repealing statute contains an express saving clause, prosecutions, liabilities and punishments under the repealed enactment continue unaffected, and no prejudicial order under revisional jurisdiction can be passed against a person without the hearing required by Section 401(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.