TaxTMI Login
Just a moment...
Press 'Enter' to add multiple search terms. Rules for Better Search
When case Id is present, search is done only for this
of 
of 
No Folders have been created
Are you sure you want to delete "My most important" ?
NOTE:
of of 
All Case Laws
of of All Case Laws
Note
Bookmark
Share
Don't have an account? Register Here
of <h1>Privy Council dismisses cross-appeal for specific performance citing significant delay in enforcing contractual rights.</h1> <h3>Ma Shwe Mya Versus Maung Mo Hnaung</h3> The Privy Council dismissed the cross-appeal for specific performance of the 1903 contract due to significant delay since its execution, emphasizing the ... - Issues:1. Interpretation of the agreement for the sale of oil wells in Burma.2. Validity of the leave to amend the pleadings.3. Application of the Limitation Act to the suit for specific performance.4. Consideration of the cross-appeal for specific performance of the contract.Analysis:1. The case involved a dispute over a contract for the sale of oil wells in Burma. The Appellant, who was the Defendant in the suit, had entered into an agreement in 1903 with the Respondent for the sale of specific oil well sites. The agreement included sites allocated for 1902 and 1903. While the 1902 sites were duly transferred, issues arose concerning the 1903 sites due to Government actions. The Respondent claimed that the Appellant failed to deliver the remaining sites agreed upon in 1912, leading to the specific performance suit in 1913.2. The District Judge found that the verbal agreement forming the basis of the claim was not proven. The Judicial Commissioner upheld this decision but allowed for an amendment to the pleadings to assess compensation for the alleged breach of the 1903 contract. However, the Privy Council noted that the rules of amendment under the Code of Civil Procedure do not permit substitution of one cause of action for another. The Court found that introducing a new case based on a different contract in 1912 was beyond the scope of permissible amendments.3. The Privy Council considered the application of the Limitation Act to the suit for specific performance. They determined that the suit, filed in 1913, was barred by limitation due to the alleged refusal by the Defendant to deliver the remaining sites in 1904 or 1905. The Court emphasized the importance of timely enforcement of contractual rights and found that the delay in seeking specific performance was fatal to the action.4. Regarding the cross-appeal for specific performance of the 1903 contract, the Privy Council highlighted the significant delay of nine years since the contract's execution. They emphasized the principle that equitable rights favor vigilant parties and stated that the Limitation Act would defeat the claim. Therefore, the cross-appeal for specific performance was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the Defendant in all courts involved in the proceedings.
TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
