Blending, benami defence, and oral family settlement pleas require strict pleadings; vague defences cannot block decree on admission.

The article explains that the doctrine of blending applies only where a coparcener clearly throws separate property into the joint family hotchpot with the intention of abandoning separate ownership; it cannot be used where that foundational status is absent. It also states that a benami defence is barred by Section 4 of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 unless the pleaded facts bring the case within a statutory exception, such as coparcenary holding or trustee/fiduciary capacity. It further notes that a vague plea of an oral family settlement, unsupported by material particulars, does not disclose a triable issue and cannot defeat a decree on admission under Order XII Rule 6 CPC.

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Issues: (i) Whether the plea that the suit property had been blended with joint family property could defeat the plaintiff's title; (ii) whether the defendant's benami defence was barred by Section 4 of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 or saved by either statutory exception; (iii) whether the vague plea of an oral family settlement disclosed any triable issue so as to resist a decree on admission.

Issue (i): Whether the plea that the suit property had been blended with joint family property could defeat the plaintiff's title.

Analysis: The doctrine of blending applies only where a coparcener, owning separate property, deliberately and unequivocally throws it into the common stock of a Hindu coparcenary with the intention of abandoning separate ownership. The plaintiff, being a daughter-in-law, was not a coparcener in the Hindu undivided family. The foundational requirement for invoking blending was therefore absent.

Conclusion: The plea of blending was held inapplicable and failed.

Issue (ii): Whether the defendant's benami defence was barred by Section 4 of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 or saved by either statutory exception.

Analysis: Section 4(2) bars a defence based on benami ownership. The statutory exceptions under Section 4(3) require, for clause (a), that the person in whose name the property stands be a coparcener and that the property be held for the benefit of coparceners, and for clause (b), that the property be held in a trustee or fiduciary capacity. The written statement did not plead facts showing that the plaintiff was a coparcener, nor did it plead any trustee or fiduciary relationship. The exceptions were therefore not attracted, and the defence remained barred.

Conclusion: The benami defence was barred in law and was not saved by either exception.

Issue (iii): Whether the vague plea of an oral family settlement disclosed any triable issue so as to resist a decree on admission.

Analysis: A pleading must state material facts with sufficient specificity. A bare or vague assertion of an oral family settlement, without particulars of who agreed, when it was agreed, where it was agreed, and on what terms, does not constitute a legally sustainable plea. Such a vague defence does not require a trial and cannot defeat relief under Order XII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Conclusion: No triable issue arose from the alleged family settlement, and decree on admission was justified.

Final Conclusion: The appeal failed as the defences of blending, benami ownership, and oral family settlement were legally untenable, and the decree passed on admissions was sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: A benami defence is unavailable unless the pleaded facts bring the case within a statutory exception, and a vague plea lacking material particulars cannot generate a triable issue or prevent a decree on admission.

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