Cheque dishonour presumption rebutted by weak delivery proof, leaving no enforceable liability and no ground to disturb acquittal.

In a cheque dishonour appeal, the court applied the Section 139 presumption but found it rebutted by admissions in the complainant's evidence and cross-examination showing no signature or reliable proof of delivery of the alleged goods. Once the accused raised a credible defence, the burden shifted back to the complainant, who failed to prove a legally enforceable liability. The court also found no perversity or material non-consideration in the trial court's acquittal, so interference was unwarranted. The acquittal was therefore upheld.

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Issues: Whether the acquittal of the accused in the cheque dishonour case called for interference in appeal.

Analysis: The complainant relied on the statutory presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, and the absence of a reply notice to contend that the cheque represented a legally enforceable liability. The evidence, however, showed material admissions from both prosecution witnesses that there was no signature or reliable delivery proof for the alleged supply of goods, and no convincing material was produced to establish that the goods covered by the invoice were actually delivered. The Court held that the accused had rebutted the complainant's case through effective cross-examination, thereby shifting the burden back to the complainant, which was not discharged. The Court also found no perversity or non-consideration of material by the trial Court so as to justify interference with an acquittal.

Conclusion: The acquittal was upheld and the appeal was rejected.

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