Repugnant repeal ordinance and settled possession rules limit forced eviction and prevent mandamus to commence unrepealed provisions.

An Ordinance repealing an earlier amendment does not need Presidential instructions or assent merely because the repealed amendment had previously received assent under the repugnancy doctrine; repeal removes the provision and does not itself create repugnancy. Promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation cannot invalidate legislation or an Ordinance. The Court also stated that where commencement of a statutory provision is left to executive discretion, mandamus cannot compel the Government to bring it into force, and once repealed the provision cannot be enforced. On possession, a true owner or statutory authority cannot dispossess a person in settled possession except in accordance with law, but no blanket injunction protects occupants without settled possession.

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Issues: (i) Whether the repeal Ordinance invalidly required Presidential instructions or assent because the amended provision had earlier received Presidential assent under the repugnancy doctrine; (ii) whether the State Government could be directed to bring the uncommenced statutory provision into force notwithstanding the repeal; and (iii) whether the development authority could be restrained from demolishing structures or dispossessing occupants otherwise than in accordance with law.

Issue (i): Whether the repeal Ordinance invalidly required Presidential instructions or assent because the amended provision had earlier received Presidential assent under the repugnancy doctrine.

Analysis: The power to promulgate an Ordinance under Article 213 is co-extensive with legislative power. The proviso requiring Presidential instructions is attracted only when the Ordinance itself contains a provision which, if enacted by State law, would need Presidential assent on account of repugnancy. Repeal of a provision previously inserted by an assent-granted amendment does not by itself create repugnancy. The repeal merely removes the earlier provision and does not introduce any offending provision of its own. The Court also rejected challenges founded on promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation, holding that those doctrines operate in administrative law and cannot invalidate legislation or an Ordinance.

Conclusion: The repeal Ordinance was valid and constitutional, and the challenge to it failed.

Issue (ii): Whether the State Government could be directed to bring the uncommenced statutory provision into force notwithstanding the repeal.

Analysis: When a statute leaves the commencement date to executive discretion, the Court cannot compel the Government by mandamus to bring the provision into force. Once the repeal Ordinance was upheld, the provision ceased to exist in the statute book. Even apart from repeal, a law that has not been notified into force confers no enforceable benefit merely because it has been enacted.

Conclusion: No direction could be issued to bring the provision into force or to consider claims under it.

Issue (iii): Whether the development authority could be restrained from demolishing structures or dispossessing occupants otherwise than in accordance with law.

Analysis: A true owner, including the State or a statutory authority, cannot forcibly dispossess a person in settled possession except in accordance with law. However, where possession is not settled, the owner may protect its possession and remove unauthorized constructions by lawful means. The Court held that the authority's statutory demolition powers under the municipal, planning, and regularisation laws do not authorise extra-legal dispossession of settled occupants. At the same time, occupants of vacant sites or persons lacking settled possession were not entitled to protection; disputed claims of settled possession or adverse possession were left to be established in appropriate civil proceedings.

Conclusion: No blanket injunction was warranted; only possession protected by settled possession and due process principles could claim relief.

Final Conclusion: The petitions as a whole were rejected, with the parties left to pursue any legally available remedies on questions of settled possession, eviction, demolition, or adverse possession in the appropriate forum.

Ratio Decidendi: A repeal Ordinance does not require Presidential instructions merely because the repealed amendment had earlier received Presidential assent, and a person in settled possession cannot be dispossessed except in accordance with law.

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