Special Court controls UAPA investigation extension, and timely default-bail application survives later charge-sheet filing.

Under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act framework read with the National Investigation Agency Act and the Code of Criminal Procedure, the power to extend investigation time up to 180 days in State police cases lies with the Special Court, not the Magistrate. The Court also applied settled default-bail principles and held that an accused who applies after expiry of the statutory period, but before filing of the charge sheet, acquires an indefeasible right to default bail. Subsequent filing of the charge sheet does not defeat that accrued right. The appellant was therefore entitled to release on default bail, subject to ordinary bail and arrest rules.

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Issues: (i) whether, in cases under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 investigated by the State police, the power to extend the investigation period up to 180 days vests in the Special Court and not in the Magistrate; (ii) whether the accused had acquired an indefeasible right to default bail before filing of the charge sheet.

Issue (i): whether, in cases under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 investigated by the State police, the power to extend the investigation period up to 180 days vests in the Special Court and not in the Magistrate.

Analysis: The scheme of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 and the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 was read together with Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The definition of "court" in the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 includes a Special Court constituted under the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008. The State notification constituting Special Courts for offences investigated by the State police meant that such offences were triable by the Special Court. Once that statutory framework applies, the reference in Section 43-D(2) to "the Court" is not to the Magistrate. The Magistrate therefore had no jurisdiction to extend the period up to 180 days.

Conclusion: The power to extend time under Section 43-D(2) vested in the Special Court and not in the Magistrate.

Issue (ii): whether the accused had acquired an indefeasible right to default bail before filing of the charge sheet.

Analysis: The right to default bail arises on expiry of the statutory period if the investigation is not completed and the accused applies for bail while the right remains alive. The Court applied the settled law that filing of the charge sheet does not defeat the right if the accused has already invoked it before such filing. The earlier application for default bail had been made after expiry of the initial period and before the charge sheet was filed, and the later filing of the charge sheet could not extinguish that accrued right.

Conclusion: The accused had acquired the right to default bail before the charge sheet was filed, and that right could not be defeated thereafter.

Final Conclusion: The impugned judgment was set aside and the appellant was held entitled to release on default bail, subject to the ordinary power of arrest or re-arrest on cogent grounds and consideration of any regular bail application on its own merits.

Ratio Decidendi: In prosecutions under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 governed by the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008, the Special Court alone can exercise the power to extend investigation time, and an accused who applies for default bail after expiry of the statutory period and before filing of the charge sheet acquires an indefeasible right that cannot be defeated by subsequent filing of the charge sheet.

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