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Issues: (i) Whether a co-accused separately tried at the instance of the prosecution was a competent witness and his evidence admissible; (ii) whether the Magistrate had discretion to order a separate trial to enable such witness to be examined for the prosecution; (iii) whether omnibus charges and the separate sentence imposed for offences alleged to have been committed in furtherance of conspiracy were legally sustainable.
Issue (i): Whether a co-accused separately tried at the instance of the prosecution was a competent witness and his evidence admissible.
Analysis: The governing principle drawn from the decided authorities was that the term "accused" in the examination provisions refers to the person who is then under trial before the Court. A person who is separately tried is not, for that purpose, an accused in the pending trial of the other accused. The evidence also disclosed no promise or inducement that would attract the exclusionary rule against improper influence.
Conclusion: The witness was competent and his evidence was admissible.
Issue (ii): Whether the Magistrate had discretion to order a separate trial to enable such witness to be examined for the prosecution.
Analysis: The joinder and severance provisions were treated as enabling provisions conferring discretion on the Magistrate. A separate trial was not shown to be illegal merely because the prosecution desired to use the evidence of the person separately tried. The availability of other procedural alternatives did not make the order unjudicial.
Conclusion: The order directing a separate trial was upheld.
Issue (iii): Whether omnibus charges and the separate sentence imposed for offences alleged to have been committed in furtherance of conspiracy were legally sustainable.
Analysis: The charge provisions require particulars of the offence and separate charging of distinct offences, even where trials may be joint under the enabling provisions. Omnibus charges alleging an indefinite number of offences over a lengthy period, without particulars of time, place, circumstances, or the role of each accused, were impermissible. Where acts done in pursuance of conspiracy are to be punished in addition to the conspiracy itself, those acts must be separately charged and particularised before a separate sentence can lawfully be imposed.
Conclusion: The convictions and separate sentences under the substantive stamp offence and the allied charges could not be sustained, while the convictions for conspiracy against accused Nos. 1 to 4 were maintained and the acquittal of accused No. 5 on the conspiracy charge was ordered.
Final Conclusion: The decision upheld the competency of the prosecution witness and the legality of the separate trial, but set aside the improper convictions and sentences on the omnibus and substantive counts, leaving the conspiracy convictions against accused Nos. 1 to 4 intact and granting relief to accused No. 5.
Ratio Decidendi: A separately tried person is a competent witness for the prosecution if he is not an accused in the pending trial, and distinct offences alleged in furtherance of a conspiracy must be specifically charged and particularised before punishment can be imposed for them separately from the conspiracy itself.