Restitution under section 144 CPC denied where the impugned sale would have occurred even under the restored decree.

The sale was upheld because the U.P. Encumbered Estates proceedings had already been quashed before the February 1939 sale, so the statutory execution bar was not operating; the later amendment and revived application were treated as fresh proceedings and did not retroactively invalidate the sale. Restitution under section 144 CPC was also refused because reversal of the compromise decree did not materially change the parties' position: the judgment-debtor had already defaulted, and the sale would have occurred in any event under the restored decree. Restoration of possession and mesne profits were therefore denied.

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Issues: (i) whether the sale held in February 1939 was invalidated by the earlier Encumbered Estates proceedings and the later amendment of those proceedings, and (ii) whether the appellant was entitled to restitution by restoration of possession and mesne profits after reversal of the compromise decree.

Issue (i): Whether the sale held in February 1939 was invalidated by the earlier Encumbered Estates proceedings and the later amendment of those proceedings.

Analysis: The proceedings under the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act had been quashed before the sale, so the statutory bar on execution did not operate at the time of the sale. The later amendment of the Act and the revived application were treated as fresh proceedings, and the prior sale could not be displaced on the theory that the earlier application should be treated as continuously pending. The point that the sale was a nullity on some other ground was not pursued.

Conclusion: The sale was not invalidated on the basis of the Encumbered Estates proceedings, and the challenge to the sale failed.

Issue (ii): Whether the appellant was entitled to restitution by restoration of possession and mesne profits after reversal of the compromise decree.

Analysis: Restitution under section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure requires that the reversal of the decree must have caused a real change in the parties' position and that the benefit obtained under the erroneous decree must be capable of being undone as a matter of justice. On the facts, the judgment-debtor had already defaulted in payment of instalments and had not shown that he could have avoided the sale even if the restored decree had been in force. The sale was therefore inevitable under the restored decree as well, so it was not truly the consequence of the reversed decree.

Conclusion: The appellant was not entitled to restitution, restoration of possession, or mesne profits.

Final Conclusion: Both appeals were rejected because the impugned sale remained effective and no restitutionary relief could be granted where the sale would have occurred in any event under the restored decree.

Ratio Decidendi: Restitution cannot be ordered under section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure where reversal of a decree does not materially alter the parties' position and the impugned sale would have been inevitable under the decree ultimately restored.

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