Setting aside ex parte payment orders: original court may reopen them under Civil Procedure Code procedure; Limitation provision inapplicable.

Section 169 of the Companies Act does not bar the court that made an ex parte payment order from entertaining an application to set it aside; rehearing is appellate in character but ex parte orders or nullities remain dischargeable by the original court. A payment order under section 150 is treated as an order (appealable as from an order) and not as a decree for Limitation Act purposes, so Article 164 is inapplicable. In absence of company law procedure, the Civil Procedure Code regime and the court's inherent powers apply; Order IX procedure (read mutatis mutandis) governs and the Limitation Act provision for CPC applications may apply.

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Issues: (i) Whether section 169 of the Companies Act, VI of 1882 applies to applications for setting aside ex parte payment orders; (ii) Whether a payment order under section 150 of the Companies Act, VI of 1882 amounts to a decree such that Article 164 of the Limitation Act governs applications to set aside it; (iii) Whether the Court of original jurisdiction has power and the procedure to set aside an ex parte payment order and the applicable limitation rule.

Issue (i): Whether section 169 of the Companies Act, VI of 1882 applies to applications for setting aside ex parte payment orders.

Analysis: Section 169 confines rehearing or re-decision to the appellate jurisdiction; historical and authoritative sources treat rehearing as part of appellate jurisdiction. However, orders obtained ex parte or which are in truth nullities remain capable of being discharged by the Court which made them. The statutory language and practicalities of notice in ex parte cases demonstrate that section 169 does not provide the exclusive remedy for setting aside ex parte orders.

Conclusion: Section 169 of the Companies Act, VI of 1882 does not apply to applications for setting aside ex parte payment orders; the original court retains power to entertain such applications.

Issue (ii): Whether a payment order under section 150 of the Companies Act, VI of 1882 amounts to a decree so that Article 164 of the Limitation Act governs applications to set it aside.

Analysis: The proviso to Clause (2) of section 2 of the Civil Procedure Code excludes from the definition of decree an adjudication from which an appeal lies as an appeal from an order. A payment order under section 150 attracts an appeal as from an order; therefore it falls outside the definition of decree for the purpose of Article 164.

Conclusion: A payment order under section 150 of the Companies Act, VI of 1882 is not a decree for purposes of Article 164 of the Limitation Act; Article 164 does not apply.

Issue (iii): Whether the Court of original jurisdiction has power and the procedure to set aside an ex parte payment order and which limitation provision applies.

Analysis: In the absence of a provision in the Companies Act for setting aside ex parte orders, the Court of original jurisdiction is governed by the general provisions of the Civil Procedure Code as made applicable by section 141 and by its inherent powers under section 151. The applicable procedure is Order IX, rule 13, mutatis mutandis. Article 181 of the Limitation Act refers to applications authorised by the Civil Procedure Code; the application in the present case was not time-barred under Article 181, rendering detailed determination unnecessary.

Conclusion: The Court of original jurisdiction may set aside an ex parte payment order under the procedure of Order IX, rule 13 read with sections 141 and 151 of the Civil Procedure Code; Article 181 of the Limitation Act may apply to such applications, and in the present case the application was not time-barred.

Final Conclusion: The appeal is dismissed; the original court retains jurisdiction to entertain applications to set aside ex parte payment orders under the Civil Procedure Code regime and the Companies Act does not oust that power.

Ratio Decidendi: Section 169 of the Companies Act, VI of 1882 does not govern setting aside of ex parte payment orders; such applications are to be entertained by the court which made the order, applying the Civil Procedure Code provisions (including Order IX, rule 13) and inherent powers, and payment orders under section 150 are not decrees for the purposes of Article 164 of the Limitation Act.

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