Forfeiture of lease requires a clear disclaimer of the landlord's title; mere adverse possession or denial is insufficient.

Forfeiture of a lease under Section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act arises only where the lessee, while the lease subsists, clearly and unequivocally renounces the tenancy by asserting title in himself or a third party, or by disclaiming the lessor's title with knowledge brought home to the lessor. An incidental claim of ownership, an adverse possession plea, or a bare denial of landlord-tenant relationship is not enough. On the facts, the alleged sale was not proved as a basis for forfeiture, and the materials did not establish the kind of clear disclaimer needed. The ejectment claim therefore failed.

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Issues: Whether the respondents' pleadings and conduct amounted to a forfeiture of lease under Section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act by a clear and unequivocal disclaimer of the landlord's title, so as to justify ejectment.

Analysis: Forfeiture under Section 111(g) arises only where the lease is subsisting and the lessee clearly renounces the character of tenant by setting up title in himself or a third person, or by an equally unequivocal disclaimer of the lessor's title, with knowledge brought home to the lessor. An incidental assertion of ownership, a plea of adverse possession, or a denial of the relationship of landlord and tenant does not by itself amount to such disclaimer. The evidence did not establish payment of rent, nor did it show any covenant prohibiting alienation with a right of re-entry on breach. The alleged sale by the respondents was not proved as a foundation for forfeiture, and the materials did not show that the respondents had knowledge of, or acted upon, the alleged lease in a manner amounting to unequivocal acknowledgment of tenancy.

Conclusion: The respondents did not commit forfeiture of the lease, and their pleas did not amount to a clear and unequivocal disclaimer of the appellant's title. The ejectment claim therefore failed.

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