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Issues: (i) Whether Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 requires an applicant to first approach the Court of Session before moving the High Court for anticipatory bail; (ii) whether the High Court may entertain a direct anticipatory bail application only on special or compelling circumstances; (iii) whether the Explanation to Section 438(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 bars a further application before the High Court after rejection by the Court of Session; and (iv) whether anticipatory bail should ordinarily continue only up to the stage of summons on the police report.
Issue (i): Whether Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 requires an applicant to first approach the Court of Session before moving the High Court for anticipatory bail.
Analysis: Section 438 confers concurrent jurisdiction on the High Court and the Court of Session. The provision contains no express bar requiring the Sessions Court to be approached first, and no such restriction can be read into a statute affecting personal liberty. Practice or convenience cannot override the plain statutory text, and the availability of concurrent forums does not convert one into a mandatory prior remedy.
Conclusion: The High Court held that the applicant is not required, as a matter of law, to first approach the Court of Session before moving the High Court.
Issue (ii): Whether the High Court may entertain a direct anticipatory bail application only on special or compelling circumstances.
Analysis: Although there is no statutory embargo on a direct approach, the exercise of discretion is not routine. The Court reconciled the competing authorities by holding that direct invocation of the High Court should ordinarily be justified by special, strong, cogent, or compelling circumstances, to be assessed on the facts of each case. The category of special circumstances cannot be exhaustively catalogued and must depend on judicial evaluation.
Conclusion: The High Court held that direct recourse to it is permissible, but ordinarily only where special circumstances justify bypassing the Sessions Court.
Issue (iii): Whether the Explanation to Section 438(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 bars a further application before the High Court after rejection by the Court of Session.
Analysis: The Explanation only removes the interlocutory character from orders passed under Section 438(1) so that they may be challenged in accordance with law. It does not create any express prohibition against a second forum. The statute expressly bars a later Sessions Court application after a High Court application, but contains no converse bar. The legislative choice not to enact a reciprocal restriction was treated as significant.
Conclusion: The High Court held that the Explanation does not bar a subsequent anticipatory bail application before the High Court after rejection by the Court of Session.
Issue (iv): Whether anticipatory bail should ordinarily continue only up to the stage of summons on the police report.
Analysis: Referring to later Supreme Court authority, the Court adopted the view that anticipatory bail should, in the present legal position, continue only until the accused is summoned on the police report under Section 173(2), after which the accused may seek regular bail. The Court noted that the larger bench issue remained pending, and followed the later binding trend.
Conclusion: The High Court held that anticipatory bail would ordinarily operate until summons on the police report, whereafter regular bail would be the appropriate remedy.
Final Conclusion: The Court answered the reference questions by affirming the availability of concurrent jurisdiction under Section 438, rejecting any mandatory rule that the Sessions Court must be approached first, recognising only a discretionary requirement of special circumstances for direct High Court access, holding that the Explanation to Section 438(2) does not bar a fresh High Court application after Sessions Court rejection, and adopting the limited operational duration of anticipatory bail then prevailing in Supreme Court authority. Applying these principles, the individual application failed for want of a factual foundation showing an imminent apprehension of arrest.
Ratio Decidendi: A statutory grant of concurrent jurisdiction for anticipatory bail cannot be converted into a mandatory sequence of forums by judicial interpretation; absent an express legislative bar, the High Court retains jurisdiction, though its direct exercise may be reserved for cases showing special circumstances.