Mandamus and tax reference law: discretionary refusal to treat a revision as belated did not create a referable question of law.
A writ of mandamus does not lie to compel a reference where the Commissioner treats a revision application as belated and declines discretionary relief. Although the revision under Section 33 was not subject to an express limitation period, the Court accepted that lateness could still justify refusal as a matter of discretion, and it would not review that assessment in mandamus proceedings. A reference under Section 66(2) was confined to a question of law arising from the order itself; on the facts, the refusal to act did not disclose a referable legal question. The petition therefore failed because the matter was discretionary and non-referable.
Issues: (i) Whether a writ of mandamus could issue to compel the Commissioner to state a case under Section 66(2) where the refusal rested on the view that the revision application under Section 33 was belated and not deserving of discretionary relief; (ii) whether the Commissioner's refusal to act on the application could be treated as giving rise to a referable question of law.
Issue (i): Whether a writ of mandamus could issue to compel the Commissioner to state a case under Section 66(2) where the refusal rested on the view that the revision application under Section 33 was belated and not deserving of discretionary relief.
Analysis: The application under Section 33 was not governed by any express limitation period, but the Court held that an application may still be regarded as belated for purposes of discretionary relief. The Commissioner was not bound to entertain the revision as of right, and his decision that the application was too late was treated as a matter of discretion. The Court further held that it could not sit in appeal over the Commissioner's assessment of lateness or direct reconsideration of that discretionary view.
Conclusion: No mandamus could issue on this ground, and the Commissioner's discretionary refusal was upheld.
Issue (ii): Whether the Commissioner's refusal to act on the application could be treated as giving rise to a referable question of law.
Analysis: The Court held that a reference under Section 66(2) lies only on a question of law arising out of the order itself. The rejection of the reference application on the footing that the matter was belated and discretionary did not, on the facts, generate a question of law fit for reference. The Court also observed that the earlier order on one point did not necessarily bar consideration of wholly distinct points, but found it unnecessary to finally decide that aspect.
Conclusion: No referable question of law was shown so as to justify a mandamus under Section 66(2).
Final Conclusion: The petition failed because the impugned refusal was treated as a discretionary and non-referable matter, beyond the Court's power of interference in these proceedings.
Ratio Decidendi: A writ of mandamus will not lie to compel a reference where the Commissioner's refusal is based on a discretionary view that a revision application is belated and no question of law arises from the order itself.
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