Court rejects appellant's claims on lease agreement, tenancy, notice validity, and subsequent events. Appeal dismissed.

The court rejected the appellant's claims regarding the existence of a ten-year lease agreement, month-to-month tenancy by holding over, validity of the notice to quit, and consideration of subsequent events. It concluded that there was no binding agreement for a ten-year lease, no month-to-month tenancy, the notice to quit was valid, and the alleged ten-year lease had expired during the trial. The court dismissed the appeal, denied a certificate for appeal to SC, and stayed ejectment proceedings for two months for the appellant to seek special leave from SC.

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Issues Involved:

1. Existence of an agreement for a ten-year lease.
2. Existence of a month-to-month tenancy by holding over after the expiry of the lease.
3. Validity of the notice to quit under Section 106, T.P. Act.
4. Permissibility of raising the ground of invalidity of the quit notice for the first time in appeal.
5. Consideration of subsequent events (expiration of the alleged ten-year lease) in affirming the decree of ejectment.

Detailed Analysis:

Issue (a): Existence of an Agreement for a Ten-Year Lease

The appellant contended that there was an agreement for a ten-year lease starting from 1972, and the lease deed (Ext. P.1) was only a partial effectuation of this agreement. The trial court found no substance in this contention. The written statement claimed a ten-year lease agreed upon before the execution of Ext. P.1. However, the evidence presented by D.W.1 (Assistant General Manager of the appellant Company) indicated negotiations for a lease extension occurred after the expiry of Ext. P.1, contradicting the written statement. The court concluded that there was no binding and concluded agreement for a ten-year lease, and thus, answered this issue against the appellant.

Issue (b): Existence of a Month-to-Month Tenancy by Holding Over

The court examined whether there was a tenancy by holding over after the expiry of the lease under Ext. P.1. The appellant's assertion of a larger right excluded the possibility of a consensual bilateral act necessary for a month-to-month tenancy by holding over. The court noted that a tenancy by holding over requires the consent of both parties, which was not present in this case. The appellant's possession after the expiry of Ext. P.1 was claimed to be in part performance of a ten-year lease, inconsistent with a tenancy by holding over. The court concluded that there was no month-to-month tenancy and no notice under Section 106 was necessary, answering this issue against the appellant.

Issue (c): Validity of the Notice to Quit

Assuming the existence of a month-to-month tenancy, the appellant argued that the notice (Ext. P.2) was invalid as it did not expire with the end of the tenancy month. The court noted that this contention was not raised in the trial court and Ext. P.2 was not replied to. The defense claimed a ten-year lease, not a month-to-month tenancy, and thus did not challenge the notice's validity on this ground. The court held that raising this contention at this stage would cause prejudice to the respondent, who could have corrected the error if raised earlier. The court answered this issue against the appellant.

Issue (d): Consideration of Subsequent Events

The respondent argued that even if a ten-year lease existed, it expired in July 1982, during the pendency of the suit. The court recognized the principle that subsequent events could be considered to grant relief to the plaintiff. The court concluded that the decree granting possession could be sustained on this basis, as the alleged ten-year lease expired during the trial. The court answered this issue in favor of the respondent.

Conclusion:

The court dismissed the appeal, finding no merit in the appellant's contentions. The court refused the certificate for appeal to the Supreme Court, as no substantial question of law of general importance was involved. The court stayed the operation of the judgment and further proceedings in ejectment for two months to allow the appellant to seek special leave from the Supreme Court.

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