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Issues: (i) Whether the later Supreme Court decision in Qamaruddin overruled or displaced the earlier line of authority holding that, under the U.P. amended Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, revision to the High Court does not lie from an appellate or revisional order of the District Court in cases below the statutory valuation threshold; (ii) Whether an appellate order of the District Court, or an order passed by it in revision under the amended Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, is amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
Issue (i): Whether the later Supreme Court decision in Qamaruddin overruled or displaced the earlier line of authority holding that, under the U.P. amended Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, revision to the High Court does not lie from an appellate or revisional order of the District Court in cases below the statutory valuation threshold.
Analysis: The amended Section 115 created distinct spheres of revisional jurisdiction for the High Court and the District Court. The earlier Full Bench view, as affirmed in later Supreme Court decisions, treated those spheres as mutually exclusive. The later decision in Qamaruddin was read as not having considered the U.P. amendment and the earlier binding authorities. A later decision by a co-equal bench does not automatically override an earlier decision where the later judgment does not notice the controlling statutory scheme or the prior authoritative rulings.
Conclusion: The later decision did not overrule the earlier Full Bench view, and revision to the High Court remained barred in the situation governed by the U.P. amendment.
Issue (ii): Whether an appellate order of the District Court, or an order passed by it in revision under the amended Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, is amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
Analysis: Ordinarily an interlocutory order in a civil suit is not to be tested under Article 226 where ordinary remedies are available. At the same time, the existence of a bar to revision does not exclude writ jurisdiction in every case. Where the impugned order reflects a violation of fundamental legal principles and causes substantial injustice, limited supervisory intervention may still be available within settled writ principles. A writ of mandamus cannot, however, be issued against a private individual unless a statutory public duty is shown.
Conclusion: The answer was qualified. Writ jurisdiction is not ordinarily available against such orders, but it is not wholly excluded where the impugned order violates fundamental legal principles and causes substantial injustice. On the facts, the petitions were not maintainable because no statutory duty on the respondents was shown.
Final Conclusion: The Court rejected the contention that the later Supreme Court decision displaced the established U.P. law on revision, and it confined Article 226 intervention to exceptional cases of legal violation and substantial injustice, while holding the present writ petitions not maintainable.
Ratio Decidendi: Where a special statutory scheme confers mutually exclusive revisional jurisdiction and a later co-equal decision does not notice the governing amendment or earlier binding authorities, the earlier line of authority is not treated as overruled; writ jurisdiction remains exceptional and cannot be used to obtain mandamus against a private party absent a statutory public duty.