Procedural amendment in insolvency notice rules was held not to apply retrospectively to notices already served.

A procedural amendment to the insolvency notice rule was held not to operate retrospectively where the petition had already been filed and notices had already been served under the former rules. The court reasoned that a change in procedure may apply to pending matters only if it does not prejudice accrued rights or require repetition of steps lawfully completed. Since the petitioner had done all that the existing procedure required and the matter had moved beyond his control, fresh notice could not be demanded merely because of the later amendment. The remand for rehearing was therefore erroneous, and the petition was allowed.

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Issues: Whether the amended notice rule under the insolvency procedure applied retrospectively to a petition already filed and notices already served, so as to require the matter to be reopened and fresh notice to be given to the alienee.

Analysis: A change in substantive law is not ordinarily retrospective unless clearly expressed, but a change in procedure may apply to pending matters only so far as it does not prejudice rights already accrued or require impossible compliance with steps already completed under the former procedure. The petitioner had filed the insolvency petition and caused notices to be served in accordance with the rules then in force. The matter had thereafter moved beyond his control, and he had done all that the existing procedure required of him. The later amendment to the notice rule could not fairly be used to invalidate what had already been properly done or to compel repetition of procedural steps at additional expense and inconvenience.

Conclusion: The amended rule was not retrospective in the sense contended for, and the order remanding the matter for rehearing was erroneous. The order of remand was set aside and the petition was allowed.

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