Impartible estate alienation by will allowed unless strict custom or statute clearly prohibits testamentary disposition.

An impartible estate governed by Mitakshara law is treated as lacking coparcenary in the Mitakshara sense, so the holder may dispose of it by will unless a restrictive custom or statute clearly bars alienation. The text explains that a custom of inalienability must be strictly proved by definite, uniform and reliable evidence; long retention of the estate intact is not enough. It also states that the Encumbered Estates Act was construed as targeting transfers with present operation during encumbered administration, not a testamentary disposition executed before management began, absent an express prohibition on testamentary succession.

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Issues: (i) Whether the holder of an impartible estate governed by Mitakshara law and lineal primogeniture could dispose of the estate by will; (ii) Whether a custom of inalienability of the estate was proved; (iii) Whether the Encumbered Estates Act, Bengal Act VI of 1876, invalidated the will.

Issue (i): Whether the holder of an impartible estate governed by Mitakshara law and lineal primogeniture could dispose of the estate by will.

Analysis: The authorities were treated as establishing that, in an impartible estate, coparcenary in the Mitakshara sense does not exist, and survivorship is relevant only for determining succession. The earlier decisions on impartible estates were read as permitting alienation in the absence of a restrictive custom. The distinction sought to be drawn between a transfer inter vivos and a will was rejected because the power of disposition was held to attach to the holder's interest in the estate.

Conclusion: The holder had power to dispose of the impartible estate by will.

Issue (ii): Whether a custom of inalienability of the estate was proved.

Analysis: The Court required strict proof of a family or local custom restraining alienation. Mere long retention of the estate intact, isolated statements, or absence of proved transfers was treated as insufficient. The evidence relied upon was found unreliable, and the instances cited did not establish a definite and uniform custom of inalienability in the family or the locality.

Conclusion: No custom of inalienability was proved.

Issue (iii): Whether the Encumbered Estates Act, Bengal Act VI of 1876, invalidated the will.

Analysis: The statutory restrictions on mortgage, charge, lease and alienation were construed as directed to alienations having present operation and to the effective management of the estate during encumbered administration. A testamentary disposition executed before the estate came under management was held not to be within the mischief of the Act, and the Act contained no express prohibition against testamentary succession. The saving of succession rights also supported this construction.

Conclusion: The will was not invalidated by the Encumbered Estates Act.

Final Conclusion: The appeal failed and the decree upholding the plaintiff's title under the will was sustained, with the incidental orders as to maintenance and costs left undisturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: An impartible estate governed by Mitakshara law is alienable, including by will, unless a specific custom or statute expressly prohibits such disposition; restrictions on alienation in an encumbered-estate statute are construed to cover only transfers having present operation unless the statute clearly extends to testamentary dispositions.

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