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Issues: Whether the concurrent conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 called for interference in revision, and whether the accused had rebutted the statutory presumption under Section 139 of the said Act.
Analysis: The revision court reiterated that, in the presence of concurrent findings by the trial court and appellate court, revisional jurisdiction is limited and does not permit the High Court to act as a second appellate court in the absence of jurisdictional error or perversity. On the facts, the complainant's evidence established the loan transaction, issuance and dishonour of the cheque, and service of statutory notice. The defence that the cheque was only a security cheque for alleged yarn transactions was found unsupported by reliable material. The court noted contradictions in the accused's version, lack of a convincing explanation for the cheque, and the failure to show that the statutory presumption stood rebutted even on a preponderance of probability.
Conclusion: The conviction and sentence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 were upheld and no revisional interference was warranted.
Ratio Decidendi: In revision, concurrent findings of guilt under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 will not be disturbed unless there is jurisdictional error or perversity, and the accused must rebut the statutory presumption by a credible preponderance of probability.