Mitakshara law and ancestral title: self-acquired immovable property remained freely alienable, and foreclosure broke ancestral character.

The sanad was construed as giving the grantee the malikana as heritable property, not as an absolute gift to a future unidentified heir. Under the Mitakshara law, a Hindu father may alienate or gift self-acquired immovable property, because the restrictive texts were treated as moral, not disabling, rules. On the facts, the village was treated as self-acquired property: a valid foreclosure had broken the ancestral title, and later acquisition did not restore its ancestral character. The objection that the decree was void due to an allegedly improperly appointed judge also failed, as the statute permitted appointment of an acting judge and imposed no immediate time-limit.

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Issues: (i) whether the malikana grant created an absolute heritable interest in favour of the grantee and his heirs; (ii) whether, under the Mitakshara law, a Hindu father could validly alienate or gift self-acquired immovable property; (iii) whether the village in dispute was ancestral property or self-acquired property; and (iv) whether the High Court decree was void because one of the judges was said to have been improperly appointed.

Issue (i): whether the malikana grant created an absolute heritable interest in favour of the grantee and his heirs

Analysis: The language of the sanad was construed as conferring on the grantee the whole income for life and the malikana allowance as part of his heritable estate. The expression referring to his heir was read as indicating succession to the allowance from generation to generation, not as creating a separate absolute gift to some future unidentified heir.

Conclusion: The grant was held to vest the malikana as heritable property in the grantee, and this part of the appellant's claim failed.

Issue (ii): whether, under the Mitakshara law, a Hindu father could validly alienate or gift self-acquired immovable property

Analysis: The conflicting passages of the Mitakshara and the commentaries were reconciled by treating the restrictive text as expressing a moral injunction rather than an absolute rule of incapacity. The reasoning of authoritative writers and the preponderance of judicial decisions were accepted as supporting the view that self-acquired property may be freely dealt with by its owner, subject to the spiritual obligations recognised by Hindu law.

Conclusion: It was held that, under the Mitakshara law, a father has power to alienate self-acquired property, including immovable property, and the challenge to the gift failed.

Issue (iii): whether the village in dispute was ancestral property or self-acquired property

Analysis: The earlier foreclosure of the mortgaged estate was treated as genuine and effective. That foreclosure broke the ancestral title, and the property was afterwards reacquired by Jaswant through later transactions. On the facts, the village was therefore not shown to retain its ancestral character.

Conclusion: The village was held to be self-acquired property, and the appellant's claim to treat it as ancestral was rejected.

Issue (iv): whether the High Court decree was void because one of the judges was said to have been improperly appointed

Analysis: The objection was held to disclose no legal basis. The relevant statute gave power to appoint an acting judge on a vacancy, and it prescribed no time-limit requiring immediate appointment or appointment within a reasonable time. No restriction could be implied by the court.

Conclusion: The appointment objection failed and did not affect the validity of the decree.

Final Conclusion: The appellant failed on every substantive and procedural ground, and the decree under appeal stood undisturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: Under the Mitakshara law, self-acquired immovable property of a Hindu father is freely alienable, and a property that has lost its ancestral character by valid foreclosure and later acquisition cannot be treated as ancestral in the hands of the subsequent holder.

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