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Issues: (i) Whether refusal of police custody after filing of the charge-sheet and taking of cognizance is an interlocutory order and whether it can be interfered with in revision; (ii) Whether the grant of bail was liable to be cancelled for haste, non-application of mind, and failure to afford the prosecution a fair opportunity; (iii) Whether the Magistrate lacked jurisdiction to grant bail merely because the offences alleged were punishable with imprisonment for life.
Issue (i): Whether refusal of police custody after filing of the charge-sheet and taking of cognizance is an interlocutory order and whether it can be interfered with in revision;
Analysis: The legal position was examined in light of Sections 167, 173(8) and 309(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. It was held that an accused who is subsequently arrested during further investigation after cognizance is governed by Section 167 so long as further investigation continues, and that police custody can be sought within the statutory limits. The earlier view treating such custody as impermissible after cognizance was treated as overruled. The refusal of police custody was also treated as a final order for the purpose of revision because it conclusively deprives the investigating agency of that relief.
Conclusion: The refusal of police custody was not sustainable and was amenable to revisional interference.
Issue (ii): Whether the grant of bail was liable to be cancelled for haste, non-application of mind, and failure to afford the prosecution a fair opportunity;
Analysis: The grant of bail was assessed against the settled principles governing cancellation of bail under Section 439(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. It was held that a superior court may cancel bail where the order is perverse, based on irrelevant material, passed without application of mind, or marked by manifest impropriety, including failure to hear the prosecution where required. The hurried manner in which the bail order was passed, coupled with the refusal of reasonable opportunity to oppose the application and the consequent obstruction to proper investigation, showed impropriety warranting interference.
Conclusion: The bail order was liable to be set aside.
Issue (iii): Whether the Magistrate lacked jurisdiction to grant bail merely because the offences alleged were punishable with imprisonment for life.
Analysis: It was held that the bar in Section 437(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is directed to offences punishable with death or imprisonment for life as alternative punishments, and not every offence where life imprisonment is one of the possible punishments. Since the offences alleged were triable by a Magistrate of the First Class, the Magistrate had jurisdiction to consider the bail application.
Conclusion: The Magistrate had jurisdiction to grant bail.
Final Conclusion: The challenge to the refusal of police custody succeeded, the bail granted by the Magistrate was set aside, and the matter was sent back for consideration of police custody in accordance with law.
Ratio Decidendi: An accused who is arrested during further investigation after cognizance may be subjected to police custody under Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and a bail order passed with haste, non-application of mind, or manifest impropriety may be cancelled under Section 439(2) of the same Code.