Dying declaration and police statement rules clarify admissibility of evidence and sustain conviction on circumstantial proof

Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act extends to a deceased person's statement about going to meet a particular person or to a place where death later occurred, if the statement is sufficiently proximate to the transaction resulting in death; on that basis, the widow's evidence was admissible. Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure bars use at trial of a statement made to police during investigation even if the maker later becomes an accused; the accused's statement was therefore inadmissible. After excluding that statement, the remaining circumstantial evidence was still sufficient to support the murder conviction, and no failure of justice was shown.

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Issues: (i) whether the deceased's statement to his widow about going to the accused's house to receive payment was admissible as a statement as to the circumstances of the transaction resulting in death under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872; (ii) whether the accused's statement to the police during investigation was barred by Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; and (iii) whether, after exclusion of the disputed statement, the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction for murder.

Issue (i): whether the deceased's statement to his widow about going to the accused's house to receive payment was admissible as a statement as to the circumstances of the transaction resulting in death under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

Analysis: Section 32(1) is not confined to statements made after the transaction has begun, or to statements made in expectation of death. The relevant words extend to statements concerning the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in death, provided they have a proximate relation to that transaction. A statement that the deceased was going to the place where he was later killed, or going to meet a particular person, or going there on invitation, is within the provision.

Conclusion: The statement was admissible and was rightly received in evidence.

Issue (ii): whether the accused's statement to the police during investigation was barred by Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Analysis: Section 162 applies in broad terms to any statement made to a police officer in the course of investigation. Its language is wide enough to include a statement made by a person who later becomes an accused. The section is not to be cut down by reading into it an exception for statements of an eventual accused, and a confession or statement so made cannot be used at trial.

Conclusion: The accused's statement was inadmissible under Section 162.

Issue (iii): whether, after exclusion of the disputed statement, the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction for murder.

Analysis: Even without the inadmissible statement, there remained strong independent evidence that the deceased had gone to the accused's house, that a trunk bought on the accused's instructions was taken there, and that the murdered body was later found in that trunk. The surrounding circumstances were sufficient to support the inference of guilt, and the erroneous admission of evidence had not occasioned a failure of justice.

Conclusion: The conviction for murder was sustainable on the evidence.

Final Conclusion: The appeal failed because the deceased's statement was properly admitted, the accused's police statement was inadmissible, and the remaining evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction without any failure of justice.

Ratio Decidendi: A statement relating to a deceased person's journey to the place where he was later killed may fall within Section 32(1) if it is sufficiently connected with the transaction resulting in death, and a statement made to police during investigation by a person who later becomes an accused is excluded by Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

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