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Issues: (i) whether the Court could entertain the writ petition despite the availability of a revisional remedy under the Code of Civil Procedure; (ii) whether an advocate's engagement could be terminated without leave of the Court under Order III Rule 4(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure; (iii) whether the advocate's professional fees and expenses could be determined and ordered to be paid in the same proceedings; and (iv) whether the quantum of fees and costs fixed by the trial Court was justified.
Issue (i): whether the Court could entertain the writ petition despite the availability of a revisional remedy under the Code of Civil Procedure.
Analysis: The available remedy under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure was adequate for challenging an order said to suffer from jurisdictional error or material irregularity. The extraordinary jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 was not to be invoked as a substitute for the statutory remedy, though the petition was nevertheless examined on merits because it had already been admitted.
Conclusion: The writ remedy was not the appropriate course where revision was available.
Issue (ii): whether an advocate's engagement could be terminated without leave of the Court under Order III Rule 4(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Analysis: Appointment of a pleader continues until it is determined with the leave of the Court, by writing signed by the client or the pleader and filed in Court, or until the proceedings end. Mere oral intimation or unilateral communication to the Court was held insufficient. The client may change counsel, but the discharge of the advocate is controlled by the Court and may be conditioned on payment of the advocate's dues.
Conclusion: Discharge without leave of the Court was ineffective in law.
Issue (iii): whether the advocate's professional fees and expenses could be determined and ordered to be paid in the same proceedings.
Analysis: The advocate was treated as entitled to seek taxation or determination of his remuneration in the very proceedings in which he had appeared, and was not required to institute a separate suit. The Court accepted that, where no misconduct or dispute as to the entitlement was shown, the Court could protect the advocate's fee before allowing discharge.
Conclusion: The trial Court had jurisdiction to determine and order payment of the advocate's dues in the same proceedings.
Issue (iv): whether the quantum of fees and costs fixed by the trial Court was justified.
Analysis: On the facts, the fee was supported by the advocate's work, specialization in company law, duration of appearances, prior billing, and the absence of a credible dispute regarding the agreed rate. The additional costs were also upheld in view of the surrounding conduct and the prolonged controversy.
Conclusion: The quantum of fees and costs fixed by the trial Court was not excessive or illegal.
Final Conclusion: The challenge to the trial Court's order failed on all material grounds, and the direction to pay the advocate's dues, together with costs, was sustained.
Ratio Decidendi: Under Order III Rule 4(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, an advocate's discharge requires leave of the Court, and where the entitlement to fees is not in bona fide dispute and no misconduct is shown, the Court may determine and secure the advocate's remuneration in the same proceedings instead of driving the advocate to a separate suit.