Jury list irregularities and juror bias require proof of real prejudice before a verdict can be set aside.

Irregularities in the annual revision and constitution of jury lists do not automatically nullify a trial where no actual prejudice is shown; defects in administrative jury machinery must be distinguished from irregularities that create real prejudice or a risk of packing. The objected juror's alleged relationship was too remote to disqualify him, and the claim of improper communications with the jury was not proved. The challenge to the juror therefore failed, and there was no sufficient ground to set aside the verdict or disturb the judgment.

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Issues: (i) Whether irregularities in the annual revision and constitution of the jury lists rendered the trial and verdict a nullity without proof of prejudice; (ii) whether the objected juror's relationship or alleged communications during trial warranted setting aside the verdict.

Issue (i): Whether irregularities in the annual revision and constitution of the jury lists rendered the trial and verdict a nullity without proof of prejudice.

Analysis: The statutory provisions governing jury lists were directed to public administration of the jury system, equal distribution of jury service, efficient attendance, and prevention of packing. The omission to perform some of those duties did not necessarily defeat the validity of proceedings where no actual prejudice was shown. Treating every failure in the administrative machinery as fatal would cause serious public inconvenience and would not advance the legislative object. The proper approach was to distinguish between defects that merely affected the regularity of the list and defects that created real prejudice or risk of packing.

Conclusion: The irregularities did not render the trial void, and absence of prejudice meant the verdict was not to be set aside on that ground.

Issue (ii): Whether the objected juror's relationship or alleged communications during trial warranted setting aside the verdict.

Analysis: The alleged relationship was too remote to constitute disqualifying relationship or affinity, and the evidence did not establish that the juror had a disqualifying interest. The allegation of improper communications with the jury was not proved. The findings of the trial judge, who had heard the witnesses, were accepted, and no sufficient basis existed to disturb them.

Conclusion: The challenge to the juror and the complaint about communications failed.

Final Conclusion: The appeal failed in substance because no legal ground was established for setting aside the verdict or judgment, and the lower courts were not to be disturbed.

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