Strict construction of revenue-jurisdiction bars confirms third-party title suits can proceed despite recovery-related attachment orders.

Section 226(1) of the Government of India Act, 1935 was construed strictly as an ouster clause, limited to cases where the claimant was personally liable for revenue or sought relief directly concerning recovery of arrears. A third-party suit for declaration of title and consequential reliefs was therefore not barred merely because the property was connected with revenue recovery, and the attachment-related prayers did not change the suit's essential character. Article 225 of the Constitution was then treated as removing the earlier restriction on High Court original jurisdiction in revenue matters, with Articles 367(1) and 395 and Section 6(e) of the General Clauses Act not preserving the former bar against pending proceedings.

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Issues: (i) Whether Section 226(1) of the Government of India Act, 1935 barred the High Court from entertaining a third party suit for declaration of title and consequential reliefs in respect of property alleged to be connected with revenue recovery; (ii) Whether the bar, if any, stood removed by Article 225 of the Constitution and was unaffected by Articles 367(1) and 395 of the Constitution or Section 6(e) of the General Clauses Act, 1897.

Issue (i): Whether Section 226(1) of the Government of India Act, 1935 barred the High Court from entertaining a third party suit for declaration of title and consequential reliefs in respect of property alleged to be connected with revenue recovery.

Analysis: The provision was construed strictly as an ouster clause affecting superior court jurisdiction only where the claimant was himself liable for revenue or was seeking relief in relation to an act or order directly concerning collection of arrears. The suit was found to be, in substance, a claim to title by a third party who was not personally concerned with the tax liability or the recovery proceedings. The consequential prayers challenging attachment and prohibitory orders did not alter the essential character of the suit. The court emphasised that jurisdiction should not be taken away by implication beyond what the language clearly required.

Conclusion: Section 226(1) did not bar jurisdiction in the plaintiff's suit.

Issue (ii): Whether the bar, if any, stood removed by Article 225 of the Constitution and was unaffected by Articles 367(1) and 395 of the Constitution or Section 6(e) of the General Clauses Act, 1897.

Analysis: The proviso to Article 225 expressly removed the pre-existing restriction on the original jurisdiction of High Courts in revenue matters. The court treated the matter as one of procedure and held that no party had a vested right to a particular forum. The repeal of the Government of India Act, 1935, did not preserve the earlier restriction so as to defeat the operation of the Constitution at the time of hearing. Section 6(e) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 was held not to prevent the later constitutional provision from applying to pending proceedings.

Conclusion: The jurisdictional bar had ceased to operate and the High Court could entertain the suit.

Final Conclusion: The plea of want of jurisdiction failed, and the suit could proceed in the High Court notwithstanding the revenue-recovery background.

Ratio Decidendi: An ouster of High Court jurisdiction in revenue matters must be strictly construed, and a procedural jurisdictional restriction removed by a later constitutional provision applies to the suit when it comes up for adjudication, including pending proceedings.

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