Service rules under constitutional authority can supersede earlier rules and justify suspension pending inquiry before retirement.

Service rules framed under constitutional authority were held to supersede earlier pre-Constitution rules, so the 1959 Punjab Civil Services Rules, including Rule 3.26(d), applied to the employee and displaced any claimed vested right to retire at a fixed age. The Court further held that Rule 3.26(d) authorised suspension, revocation of leave preparatory to retirement, and retention in service until inquiry was completed; the action was effective before retirement and was not invalid for want of prior charge-sheet communication, service, or alleged retrospectivity. Allegations of mala fides were not proved, and no violation of Articles 13, 14, 19, or 23 was established.

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Issues: (i) Whether the 1959 Punjab Civil Services Rules, including Rule 3.26(d), applied to a Government servant who had entered service before the Constitution and claimed protection under the earlier rules; (ii) whether the orders placing the petitioner under suspension, revoking leave preparatory to retirement, and retaining him in service till completion of inquiry were valid; (iii) whether the impugned action was vitiated by mala fides or by infringement of constitutional guarantees.

Issue (i): Whether the 1959 Punjab Civil Services Rules, including Rule 3.26(d), applied to a Government servant who had entered service before the Constitution and claimed protection under the earlier rules.

Analysis: The earlier rules were held to have continued only until other provision was made under the Constitution. The petitioner had entered the later service as a new entrant after partition and had accepted service subject to alteration of service conditions. The Court held that Article 309 empowered the competent authority to make new rules, that Article 313 preserved the old rules only until such other provision was made, and that the 1959 Rules lawfully replaced the earlier regime. No vested right to retire at a fixed age survived once the later rules came into force.

Conclusion: The 1959 Rules applied to the petitioner, and Rule 3.26(d) governed his case.

Issue (ii): Whether the orders placing the petitioner under suspension, revoking leave preparatory to retirement, and retaining him in service till completion of inquiry were valid.

Analysis: Rule 3.26(d) was construed to permit retention in service of a Government servant under suspension on a charge of misconduct until the inquiry concluded. The Court held that the rule did not require prior communication of the charge-sheet with the suspension order, that suspension was an administrative act, and that the authority empowered to appoint also had power to suspend under the relevant general clauses provision. Leave preparatory to retirement remained leave and could be revoked in the circumstances of the case. The notification was published before the date of retirement and therefore operated before the petitioner could validly claim to have left service. The contention that the order was retrospective, ultra vires, or ineffective for want of service was rejected.

Conclusion: The suspension, cancellation of leave, and retention in service were valid and effective.

Issue (iii): Whether the impugned action was vitiated by mala fides or by infringement of constitutional guarantees.

Analysis: The allegations of personal bias and mala fides were treated as disputed questions of fact and were not established. The Court held that proceeding departmentally instead of by criminal prosecution did not amount to discrimination under Article 14, that continued service under the applicable rules did not amount to forced labour under Article 23, and that the petitioner had no enforceable fundamental right to be freed from service contrary to the governing service rules. No violation of Articles 13, 14, 19 or 23 was made out.

Conclusion: The plea of mala fides and constitutional invalidity failed.

Final Conclusion: The petition was dismissed, with the Court holding that the later service rules validly applied, that the suspension and retention order was legally sustainable, and that no mala fides or constitutional infringement was proved.

Ratio Decidendi: Service rules framed under constitutional authority can lawfully supersede earlier service rules applicable to continuing government servants, and where a valid rule authorises suspension and retention pending inquiry, such administrative action does not become invalid merely because the officer has reached the age of superannuation or is on leave preparatory to retirement.

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