Pre-emption on transfer in satisfaction of dower debt upheld, with deposit time fixed as a definite period.

A transfer of immovable property by a husband to his wife in part satisfaction of an existing dower debt was treated as a sale, because a cash debt is valuable consideration and a conveyance in lieu of that debt falls within Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act as adopted by the Agra Pre-emption Act. The transaction was therefore pre-emptible despite its character under Mahomedan law. On the procedural issue, the Court held that deposit time under the rule should be fixed by a definite period and adjusted the time for payment to two months from the judgment date. The appeal failed on the substantive pre-emption issue, with only the deposit period modified.

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Issues: (i) Whether a transfer of immovable property by a husband to his wife in part satisfaction of her dower debt was a sale and therefore pre-emptible. (ii) Whether time for payment of pre-emption money could be fixed from the date of the appellate decree instead of a definite date under the procedural rule.

Issue (i): Whether a transfer of immovable property by a husband to his wife in part satisfaction of her dower debt was a sale and therefore pre-emptible.

Analysis: The transfer was made in consideration of an existing dower debt. A debt in cash is a valuable consideration, and a conveyance in lieu of such debt answers the definition of sale under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Section 4(10) of the Agra Pre-emption Act adopts that definition for purposes of pre-emption. The character of the transaction under Mahomedan law does not displace the statutory definition applied by the Act.

Conclusion: The transaction was a sale within the meaning of the applicable law and was pre-emptible.

Issue (ii): Whether time for payment of pre-emption money could be fixed from the date of the appellate decree instead of a definite date under the procedural rule.

Analysis: The appellate court had granted time linked to finality of the decree, whereas the procedural rule contemplated fixation of a definite time for deposit. The time for payment was therefore adjusted by the Court by specifying a period from the date of its judgment.

Conclusion: Time for deposit was fixed at two months from the date of the judgment.

Final Conclusion: The appeal failed on the substantive question of pre-emption, and the decree in favour of the plaintiff was maintained with modification only as to the time allowed for deposit of the pre-emption money.

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