1978 (11) TMI 164 - HC - Indian Laws

Interpretation of 'tenant' under Delhi Rent Control Act: Limited inheritance rights clarified

Haji Mohammed Din And Anr. Versus Narain Dass

The court in this case analyzed the meaning of 'tenant' in the Delhi Rent Control Act, both before and after the 1976 amendment. It addressed the ... - Issues Involved:1. Meaning of 'tenant' in Section 2(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, before and after the amendment of 1976.2. Applicability of the Supreme Court decision in Damadilal v. Parashram to the old definition of 'tenant'.3. Interpretation of clauses (ii) and (iii) of the new definition of 'tenant' in Section 2(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.4. Distinction between residential and non-residential premises in the context of the amended definition of 'tenant'.Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:1. Meaning of 'Tenant' in Section 2(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, Before and After the Amendment of 1976:The original definition of 'tenant' in Section 2(1) of the principal Act included any person by whom or on whose account or behalf the rent of any premises is payable, including a sub-tenant and any person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy, but excluded any person against whom an order or decree for eviction had been passed. The amendment in 1976 redefined 'tenant' to include sub-tenants, persons continuing in possession after the termination of their tenancy, and, in the event of their death, certain specified heirs living with them up to the date of their death.2. Applicability of the Supreme Court Decision in Damadilal v. Parashram to the Old Definition of 'Tenant':The decision in Anand Nivas Pvt. Ltd. v. Anandji Kalyanji Pedhi, followed in J. C. Chatterjee v. Sri Kishan Tandon, held that a person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy was a statutory tenant, and his legal representatives could not inherit the tenancy or the statutory protection. However, in Damadilal v. Parashram, the Supreme Court held that a person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy was a tenant of the same kind as a contractual tenant, and his legal representatives could inherit the tenancy and statutory protection. The court in the present case preferred the decision in Damadilal over Anand Nivas and J. C. Chatterjee, noting that the former was subsequent and considered the latter decisions.3. Interpretation of Clauses (ii) and (iii) of the New Definition of 'Tenant' in Section 2(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958:The amended definition of 'tenant' in Section 2(1) includes any person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy and, in the event of his death, certain specified heirs living with him up to the date of his death. The court noted that the amendment was a compromise between the landlords' claims for immediate possession and the heirs' claims to inherit the statutory protection. The court held that the legal representatives had a limited right of inheritance as specified in the amended definition, which was retrospective and applied from the inception of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.4. Distinction Between Residential and Non-residential Premises in the Context of the Amended Definition of 'Tenant':The court held that the limited right of inheritance granted by the amended definition of 'tenant' applied only to residential premises. This conclusion was based on the reasoning that the heirs could only be living with the tenant in residential premises at the time of his death. The court cited the Supreme Court decision in Ganpat Ladha v. Sashikant Vishnu Shinde, which construed similar words in the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act to apply only to residential premises.Separate Judgments Delivered:H.L. Anand, J.:Justice Anand concurred with the majority opinion but expressed concerns about the anomaly resulting from the conflicting Supreme Court decisions and the delay in further legislative action. He highlighted the hardship caused to legal representatives of tenants and suggested that the larger questions should be raised before the Division Bench or addressed through further legislative action.M.L. Jain, J.:Justice Jain agreed with the majority opinion, emphasizing that the legislative amendment of 1976 should prevail over the judicial declaration in Damadilal. He noted that the amendment limited the heritability of tenancy rights to certain specified heirs in certain circumstances and applied only to residential premises. He concluded that the court could not extend the scope of judicial review to repeal the law and that any hardship caused by the amendment could only be relieved by further legislative action.