Appealability under income-tax law turns on the real character of the order, not its label, and statutory bars prevail.

The real nature of an income-tax assessment order controls appealability, and an assessment that in substance falls under Section 23(4) of the Income-tax Act, 1922 is not appealable because Section 30 bars an appeal against such an order; a mistaken description of the order does not create appellate rights or sustain a reference under Section 66(2). An order refusing registration of a firm made before the 1933 amendment was also outside the then available appellate remedy, so no appeal lay on that issue either. The assessee therefore failed on both questions, and the discussion confirms that appellate rights depend on the statute in force and the true character of the order.

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Issues: (i) whether an assessment made under Section 23(4) of the Income-tax Act, 1922 was appealable and could support a valid reference under Section 66(2); (ii) whether an order refusing registration of a firm made before the amendment by Act 18 of 1933 was appealable.

Issue (i): whether an assessment made under Section 23(4) of the Income-tax Act, 1922 was appealable and could support a valid reference under Section 66(2).

Analysis: The assessment was held, on the facts and substance of the order, to fall under Section 23(4) despite being mistakenly treated as one under Section 23(3). Section 30 expressly barred an appeal against an assessment made under Section 23(4), and the absence of a right of appeal also negatived a valid reference on that issue. The decision proceeded on the actual character of the assessment order and not on the mistaken label attached to it.

Conclusion: The question was answered against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue; no appeal lay against the assessment.

Issue (ii): whether an order refusing registration of a firm made before the amendment by Act 18 of 1933 was appealable.

Analysis: The order refusing registration was made prior to the date from which the amended appeal right took effect. On that footing, the order fell outside the scope of any appellate remedy then available.

Conclusion: The question was answered against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue; no appeal lay against the refusal to register the firm.

Final Conclusion: The reference was disposed of by holding that the impugned assessment and the refusal to register the firm did not give rise to any appellate remedy on the facts found, and the assessee failed on the substantive questions referred.

Ratio Decidendi: For determining appealability under the Income-tax Act, the real nature of the assessment order controls, and where the statute bars an appeal against an assessment under Section 23(4), no appellate or referential challenge lies merely because the order was misdescribed or because no post-amendment right of appeal had yet accrued.

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