Burden of proving notice in specific performance shifts back to the plaintiff when a subsequent purchaser denies prior agreement.

In a suit for specific performance, the prior contract alone did not defeat a subsequent purchaser who denied notice of that agreement; once the transferee specifically pleaded and supported denial of knowledge, the burden shifted back to the plaintiff, and the finding of no notice was upheld on evidence. The suit also could not be defeated merely because some time had elapsed where it was filed within the limitation period under Article 54; delay short of limitation did not, by itself, amount to waiver or acquiescence. The dismissal of the suit was therefore sustained on the notice issue.

---

---

Issues: (i) Whether, in a suit for specific performance, the burden remained on the plaintiff to prove that the subsequent purchaser had notice of the prior agreement after the defendants denied such knowledge. (ii) Whether the suit could be defeated on the ground of delay when it was filed within the period prescribed for specific performance.

Issue (i): Whether, in a suit for specific performance, the burden remained on the plaintiff to prove that the subsequent purchaser had notice of the prior agreement after the defendants denied such knowledge.

Analysis: The settled rule is that after the plaintiff proves the prior contract, the burden lies on the subsequent transferee to show that he purchased for value in good faith and without notice. But where the transferee specifically denies knowledge of the prior contract, even a denial may be sufficient to discharge the initial onus and shift the burden back to the plaintiff. On the facts, the contesting defendant had pleaded and proved denial of notice, and the concurrent finding that he had no knowledge of the agreement before purchase was based on the evidence and was not perverse.

Conclusion: The burden was correctly treated as having shifted to the plaintiff, and the finding that the subsequent purchaser lacked notice was upheld.

Issue (ii): Whether the suit could be defeated on the ground of delay when it was filed within the period prescribed for specific performance.

Analysis: A suit for specific performance governed by Article 54 can be brought within three years from the relevant starting point under that article. Since no date for performance was fixed, the suit could be filed when refusal of performance became known. The suit was instituted within the limitation period, and mere delay short of limitation did not by itself establish waiver or acquiescence. The appellate court was wrong to treat the lapse of time as an independent disqualifying factor, though that error did not affect the ultimate result because the main finding on notice remained against the plaintiff.

Conclusion: The suit was not barred or defeated merely on the ground of delay within limitation.

Final Conclusion: The plaintiff failed on the crucial question of notice to the subsequent purchaser, and the dismissal of the suit was sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: In a suit for specific performance, the plaintiff's prior contract does not by itself establish entitlement against a subsequent transferee who denies notice; once such denial is made and supported, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff. Delay within the statutory limitation period does not amount to waiver or acquiescence.

---